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VENTURA V. KYLE AND AMERICAN SNIPER: THE
ANATOMY OF A PUBLIC FIGURE'S LAWSUIT
By: Mike Steenson*
ABSTRACT

Chris Kyle's book, American Sniper, detailed his exploits as a prolifc
Navy SEAL sniper. In a book subchapterKyle detailedan encounter with
a "Mr. Scruff Face" in a San Diego Bar. The book states that Ventura
made certain statements that were demeaning of the United States and
the Navy SEALS. " Scruff Face was subsequently identified by Chris Kyle
as Jesse Ventura, former governor of Minnesota. Ventura sued Chris
Kyle for defamation, appropriation,and unjust enrichment. Relying on
trial court documents, briefs, and the opinions in the case, this article
probes those theories of recovery with an emphasis on the jury
instructions, with a view to establishing clearer instructions in public
figure lawsuits involving overlapping defamation and appropriation
claims.

* Bell Distinguished Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION - THE STORY

Chris Kyle, a prolific Navy SEAL sniper, wrote a book about his life
entitled American Sniper, the Autobiography of the Most Lethal Sniper
in U.S. Military History.' The book was released at the beginning of
January 2012.2 By the end of January, it had topped the New York Times'
Bestseller list. 3 In June of 2012, Warner Brothers purchased the film
rights.' The book was subsequently made into a movie, American
Sniper.5
The book details Chris Kyle's life before he joined the Navy, his
experiences training to be a SEAL, his marriage, war experiences, and
struggles to adjust to life in the United States between deployments and
after his discharge.6 It intersperses Tara Kyle's observations about the
turmoil in her marriage to Chris Kyle.
There are numerous instances in the book that detail Kyle's drinking
episodes, brawls and altercations. 8 In chapter 12 of the book, covering
Kyle's experiences while home after his third deployment to Iraq, he
wrote in a subchapter, Mr. Scruff Face, of an alleged encounter in a bar
at a wake for a fellow SEAL who was killed in the line of duty in Iraq:
AFTER THE FUNERAL WE WENT TO A LOCAL
BAR FOR THE WAKE proper.
As always, there were a bunch of different things going on
at our favorite nightspot, including a small party for some
older SEAL's and UDT members who were celebrating
the anniversary of their graduation. Among them was a
celebrity I'll call Scruff Face.

1 CHRIS KYLE, WITH SCOTT MCEWEN & JIM DEFELICE, AMERICAN SNIPER, THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE MOST LEGAL SNIPER IN U.S. MILITARY HISTORY
(2012) [hereinafter AMERICAN SNIPER].
2 Ventura

v. Kyle, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1005 (D. Minn. 2014).

3Id.
4

Id.

5

Id.; AMERICAN SNIPER (Warner Brothers 2014).

6Id.
8

Id.
Id.

3 54-56
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Scruff served in the military; most people seem to believe
he was a SEAL. As far as I know, he was in the service
during the Vietnam conflict but not actually in the war.
I was sitting there with Ryan and told him that Scruff was
holding court with some of his buddies.
"I'dreally like to meet him," Ryan said.
"Sure." I got up and went over to Scruff and introduced
myself.
"Mr. Scruff Face, I have a young SEAL over here who's
just come back from Iraq. He's been injured but he'd
really like to meet you."
Well, Scruff kind of blew us off. Still, Ryan really wanted
to meet him, so I brought him over. Scruff acted like he
couldn't be bothered.
All right.
We went back over to our side of the bar and had a few
more drinks. In the meantime, Scruff started running his
mouth about the war and everything and anything he could
connect to it. President Bush was an asshole. We were
only over there because Bush wanted to show up his
father. We were doing the wrong thing, killing men and
women and children and murdering.
And on and on. Scruff said he hates America and that's
why he moved to Baja California. 9/11 was a conspiracy.
And on and on some more.
The guys were getting upset. Finally, I went over and tried
to get him to cool it.
"We're all here in mourning," I told him. "Can you just
cool it? Keep it down."
"You deserve to lose a few," he told me. Then he bowed
up as if to belt me.
I was uncharacteristically level-headed at that moment.
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"Look," I told him, "why don't we just step away from
each other and go on our way?" Scruff bowed up again.
This time he swung.
Being level-headed and calm can last only so long. I laid
him out.
Tables flew. Stuff happened. Scruff Face ended up on the
floor.
I left.

Quickly.
I have no way of knowing for sure, but rumor has it he
showed up at the BUD/S graduation with a black eye.9
"Scruff Face" was not named in the book, but Kyle confirmed in radio,
television, and print interviews that it was Jesse Ventura, former Navy
Special Forces Underwater Demolition/SEAL Teams member during the
Vietnam War, professional wrestler, actor, and former Governor of
Minnesota.10 On two talk shows Kyle repeated the alleged statement that
Ventura said "You deserve to lose a few guys." The same statement
appeared on Fox News."
Based on the book subchapter and interviews, Ventura sued Kyle in state
district court, asserting claims of defamation, misappropriation, and
unjust enrichment.12 The case was removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota. 1 3 After Kyle was killed by a fellow
veteran in February 2013, his wife was appointed executrix of his estate
and substituted as the defendant in the lawsuit in July of 2013.1'

9Ventura

v. Kyle, supra note 2 at 1005-06.

10 Id. at 1006.

Id.
Complaint, Ventura v. Kyle (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2012) (No. 27-CV-12-422 1).
13 See Notice of Removal, Ventura v. Kyle, 2012
WL 4844623 (D. Minn. Feb. 23,
2012).
14 Ventura v. Kyle, supra note 2 at 1006.
12
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The case was tried to a jury in July of 2014 on the three claims the
plaintiff asserted in the complaint. Because the unjust enrichment claim
was equitable, the jury acted in an advisory capacity only on that claim."
The jury struggled to reach a verdict. After four full days of deliberation,
the jury concluded that it could not reach a decision. After the district
court instructed the jury to continue its deliberations, they reported back
the next day, still unable to reach a verdict. The following morning the
parties consented to a 9-1 verdict, but the jury still could not reach a
verdict. The next day the parties agreed to an 8-2 verdict on the fifth full
day of deliberations.1 6
The jury found for Ventura on the defamation claim and awarded him
$500,000 in damages.1 The jury found for Kyle on the appropriation
claim but found for Ventura on the unjust-enrichment claim and awarded
damages of $1,345,477.25." The district court adopted the jury's
findings on the unjust-enrichment claim.1 9 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed.20 Ventura petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
It was denied on January 9, 2017.21

15 Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c)(1) covers the use of juries in an advisory capacity.
The
jury instructions on liability and damages are set out in an appendix to this article.
16

Ventura v. Kyle, supra note 2 at 1006

17

Id.

18

Id.
Id.
20 Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3876). The Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court on the defamation claim because "Ventura's
counsel's closing remarks, in combination with the improper cross-examination of two
witnesses about Kyle's insurance coverage, prevented Kyle from receiving a fair trial."
Id. at 886. While a key issue, the insurance question is not analyzed in this article
because it is unrelated to the article's main themes.
21 Ventura v. Kyle, 137 S. Ct. 667 (2017). The petition for certiorari was based on
Ventura's claim that the Eighth Circuit denied him his Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial:
Is a defamation plaintiff denied his Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury
where, in the absence of "extraordinary circumstances" or a "plain
miscarriage of justice," an appellate court vacates a damages verdict that was
found to be neither excessive nor irrational based upon its subjective opinion
that comments made during closing argument to which the defense chose not
to object until after the jury retired to deliberate were "prejudicial"?
Ventura v. Kyle, 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3978, at *4-*5 (Oct. 31, 2016).
19
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This article traces the case from its initiation through the Eighth Circuit's
decision. With the aid of briefs and other trial court documents in the
case, it examines the development of the theories in the case, the
defenses, the jury instructions and special verdict form, and the appeal
and Eighth Circuit's decision.
The case raises an array of questions concerning invasion of privacy,
defamation, and unjust enrichment theories, their relationship to each
other, the recoverable damages under the theories, and the First
Amendment implications involved in the theories as they were asserted
in the case. The primary focus is on how cases involving public figures
should be submitted to juries, including how juries should be instructed
and what special verdict questions should accompany those instructions.
As the article demonstrates, the concepts involved in the theories may be
understandable to judges and lawyers, but making them comprehensible
to juries is yet another question. That is the primary focus of this article.
Part I of this article examines Ventura's complaint. Part II analyzes
Ventura's claims of defamation, appropriation, and unjust enrichment.
The analysis of the claims focuses on the disputed issues involved in each
of the claims and the jury instructions and verdict form that emerged from
those disputes. The article concludes with some suggestions that simplify
the instructions and clarify the verdict form that might be used these sorts
of cases in order to facilitate a jury's understanding of the law and its
ability to apply it.
II.

THE COMPLAINT

The complaint in the case was initially filed in Ramsey County District
Court. It identifies Ventura as a former governor of Minnesota and "a
veteran of the United States Navy, having served his country as a member
of the Naval Special Forces Underwater Demolition/SEAL Teams." 2 2 It
describes his current occupation as "that of television performer and host
for a program titled Conspiracy Theory, which airs on the truTV network,
and . . . a bestselling author who continues to write books." It also
identifies him as "an active political commentator" who "has not
definitely ruled out another run for political office."2 3

22

Complaint,

¶ 5, Ventura v. Kyle (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2012) (No. 27-CV-12-4221)

[hereinafter Complaint].
23
_d. at¶8.
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The complaint alleged that:
Governor Ventura has become well known to the public
throughout the United States as a professional wrestler,
entertainer, actor, speaker, author, and politician; has
created for himself a unique public personality and image;
and his professional names, "Jesse Ventura" and "Jesse
'the Body' Ventura," as well as his image, voice,
photograph likeness and public persona, have become
commercially valuable commodities.24

&

The core of the complaint concerns the statements made by Chris Kyle in
his book, specifically the sub-chapter that is captioned "Punching Out
Scruff Face," 25 which details the alleged encounter between Kyle and
Ventura at a bar in San Diego. Ventura was not identified by name, but
the complaint alleges that Kyle later identified "Scruff Face" as Ventura
in talk show appearances, including two appearances on the Opie
Anthony radio show,26 and the O'Reilly Factor.2 7 His appearance on the
O'Reilly Factor was then discussed on The Five, a FOX News
commentary show in which the hosts discussed the incidents, agreeing
that Kyle was telling the truth concerning the comments attributed to
Ventura.2 8
The complaint establishes the factual allegations for the counts that
follow:
Knowing that the alleged statements he attributes to
Governor Ventura were never made, and that the alleged
assault and battery incident involving Governor Ventura
had never occurred, for the purpose of gaining notoriety
and generating publicity for his American Sniper book,
and thereby furthering his own economic gain, and/or for
other reasons presently unknown, Kyle knowingly,
intentionally and maliciously published the false and

24

Id.at¶6.

25 AMERICAN SNIPER at 354.

Complaint, supra note 16,
Id. at¶ 24.
28
Id. at¶ 23.
26
27

¶ 21.
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defamatory statements of and concerning Governor
Ventura ...
By falsely claiming that Governor Ventura said United
States Navy SEALs deserve to die, Kyle intended to inflict
a vicious, deliberate and calculated assault on Governor
Ventura's character, honor and reputation, and to turn the
SEAL and military community, and Americans in general,
against Governor Ventura and to cause them to have
contempt, scorn, disgust and hatred for him, and to hold
him in the lowest possible regard.
By his own admission, Kyle has gained more notoriety
and publicity for the false, defamatory and malicious
statements he has made about Governor Ventura, than he
has for all of the military exploits he writes about in
American Sniper.29
The first count in the complaint alleged defamation, including libel and
slander. The complaint alleges that because of the defamatory statements,
"Governor Ventura's reputation and standing in the community,
including Minnesota and the United States, has been harmed, he has been
embarrassed and humiliated, and he has suffered emotional distress.3 0
The complaint also alleged that the publication of the statements "has
negatively affected, and will continue to negatively affect Governor
Ventura in connection with his businesses and professions, including but
not limited to his current and future opportunities as a political candidate,
political commentator, author, speaker, television host and personality,
and all other commercial endeavors that involve exploitation of his name,
likeness and public persona."31
Count two alleged misappropriation of Ventura's name and likeness. It
alleged that "Governor Ventura has acquired a property right in the
exclusive commercial use of his own identity, as represented by his name,
image, voice, photograph and public persona,"3 2 and that "Kyle has
wrongfully appropriated and used Governor Ventura's identity for his
29
30

1d.

at ¶¶ 32-34.

Id. at 42.
31
Id. at¶43.
32
Id. at¶ 47.

90

U. OFDENVER SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENTL.J.

(VOL. 22

own economic advantage and gain, including Governor Ventura's name,
image and public persona." 3 3
Count three alleged unjust enrichment. It alleged that "[a]s a direct result
of his tortious, inequitable and unlawful conduct, Kyle has been unjustly
enriched at Governor Ventura's expense," 34 and that "[e]quity requires
that Kyle make restitution to Governor Ventura for all property and
benefits unjustly received, including but not limited to income from the
sale of American Sniper books and/or any subsidiary or ancillary rights
sales." 35
The complaint prayed for damages in excess of $50,00036 for the
defamation and invasion of privacy counts and "restitution for all
property and benefits unjustly received." 37
III.

THE THEORIES OF RECOVERY

Each of the theories presented complex problems that had to be resolved
by the trial court in deciding whether and how the case should be
submitted to the jury.
A. Defamation
Ventura alleged that Kyle's story about the altercation in the bar was false
and Kyle knew it or had serious doubts about the veracity of the story. As
the case proceeded, several issues arose concerning the clam. The parties
generally agreed on the definition of defamation and the standard for
determining falsity, but there were also several contested issues
concerning the defamation claim. One was whether the defamation claim
was confined to the specific statements attributed to Ventura or
encompassed the whole story (the Scruff Face subchapter), and the
correlative question of whether the district court erred in instructing the
jury. A second was whether the clear and convincing evidence or
convincing clarity standard, which is the standard that applies as a
33

Id. at 48.
Id. at¶ 50.
35
Id. at 51.
36 Minnesota law provides that "If a recovery of money in an amount greater than
$50,000 is demanded, the pleading shall state merely that recovery of reasonable
damages in an amount greater than $50,000 is sought." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 544.36
(2016).
37 Complaint, supra note 16, at 17.
34
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constitutional mandate to the actual malice issue in defamation cases
involving public figures, also applied to the falsity element, and whether
the trial court erred in failing to instruct that Ventura had to meet the
higher evidentiary standard on the falsity issue. A third involved the issue
of whether the trial court committed error in instructing the jury to
consider whether the story was defamatory, rather than just the isolated
statements in the story. A fourth concerned the damages that may be
awarded in a defamation action, including the issues of whether Ventura
should be entitled to recover for damages for emotional harm and how
the rule permitting presumed damages should apply.
1. Jury Instructions-Defamation and Falsity
The requested instructions on the definition of defamation submitted by
Ventura3 8 and Kyle 39 followed Minnesota's pattern jury instruction on
the definition of defamation. The district court used that instruction:
The first element is that Mr. Kyle's story about Mr.
Ventura was defamatory. The story was defamatory if it
tends to:
1. So harm the reputation of Mr. Ventura that it lowers his
esteem in the community; or
2. Deter persons from associating or dealing with him; or
3. Injure his character; or
4. Subject him to ridicule, contempt, or distrust; or
5. Degrade or disgrace him in the eyes of others.
Mr. Ventura must prove this element by the greater weight

Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions, Ventura v. Kyle, at 24 (D. Minn. Apr. 21,
2014) (No. 12-0472).
39 Defendant's Revisions to Selected Proposed Jury Instructions at 1-8; Ventura, 63 F.
Supp. 3d at 1001; Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-cv-0472, 2014 WL 8721598 (D. Minn. July
18, 2014).
38

92
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of the evidence (see Instruction No. 7).40
2. The Individual Statements or the Entire Story?
There was conflict at the outset of the case over the basis for the
defamation claim and the method of submitting the claim to the jury. The
complaint in the case focused on the specific statements Kyle attributed
to Ventura, although Ventura claimed that the entire story was
defamatory. In response to interrogatories, Ventura listed 15 separate
statements in the story that were alleged to be defamatory.
Pruning the list to six statements, Kyle wanted the jury to be able to
independently determine whether each statement met the definition of
defamation, whether the statements were published with actual malice,
and then decide what damages were caused by each statement.4 2
Ventura's position in the case was that the individualized consideration
Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 8A, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729686 (D.
Minn. July 22, 2014) (No. 12-cv-0472). The court's definition is standard in pattern
instructions. See, e.g., ARIZONA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, Defamation 2
40

-

(2017); CAL. JURY INSTR.--CIV. 7.00 (Mar. 2018); PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS KANSAS
CIVIL 127.51 (Nov. 2016); 8 TENN. PRAC. PATTERN JURY INSTR. T.-CIVIL 7.01 (2017
ed.).
41 Defendant's Trial Brief, Part I., B, Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-cv-0472, 2014 WL
3729664 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2014). The fifteen statements were:
1. Ventura said that he "hates America."
2. Ventura said Navy SEALs "deserve to lose a few."
3. Ventura said Navy SEALs "deserve to lose a few guys."
4. Ventura said "y'all [Navy SEALs] deserve to lose a few guys."
5. Ventura said Navy SEALs "were killing innocent people."
6. Ventura said Navy SEALs "were murderers."
7. Ventura said "We were doing the wrong thing, killing men and women and
children and murdering."
8. Ventura "bowed up as if to belt" Kyle.
9. Ventura "bowed up again."
10. Ventura "swung" at Kyle.
11. "Stuff happened. Scruff Face ended up on the floor."
12. Ventura "showed up at the BUD/S graduation with a black eye."8
13. Kyle "was in a bar fight with Jesse Ventura," Kyle "punched him . . in the
face," "he went down," Kyle "knocked him down," Kyle "popped him,"
and/or "he [Ventura] went down."
14. Ventura threatened or assaulted Kyle.
15. Kyle physically assaulted, battered, or punched Ventura.
42 Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Reply to Defendant's Trial Brief, Part A, Ventura v. Kyle,
2014 WL 3729676 (D. Minn. May 5,2014) (No. 12-0472).
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of the statements would actually detract from the jury's consideration of
whether the entire story was fabricated.4 3 Ventura argued that:
It is, of course, obvious why the Estate wants the jury to
consider particular words and phrases isolated from Kyle's
story as a whole: when taken out of context, words lose
not only their original meaning, but also lose their power
to evoke emotion, and to cause harm. The Estate's
proposed verdict form illustrates the point."
Kyle's position was reiterated in her response to Ventura's brief in
opposition to Kyle's motion for judgment as a matter of law:
Why is it important for the Court to engage in this paringdown exercise? Because if the jury is simply asked to
decide whether the entire "Punching Out Scruff Face"
subchapter is materially false, it could find that the
statement that Ventura said "You deserve to lose a few" is
not materially false, but that the statement that Kyle
punched Ventura (or that "tables flew" or that Ventura
was rumored to have a black eye) is materially false. It
could then go on to find that, because the subchapter as a
whole (including the portions it believed to be true)
damaged Ventura's reputation, Ventura is entitled to
monetary compensation. This would be a miscarriage of
justice because the jury would be awarding Ventura
damages even though the only portions of the subchapter
that it found to be materially false (i.e., the statements
related to the physical altercation, as opposed to the verbal
exchange) are-as Ventura concedes - not defamatory and
thus not actionable. Such a broad and ambiguous verdict
would complicate independent review both by this Court
upon a motion for JNOV and for appellate courts at a later
stage.

44

Id.

Id.

Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, Ventura
v. Kyle, No. 12-cv-0472, 2014 WL 3729672 (D. Minn. July 21, 2014) (footnote
omitted).
4

94

U. OFDENVER SPORTS & ENTERTAINMENTL.J.

(VOL. 22

Kyle lost the argument. As submitted, the verdict form asked only "Did
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura prove his claim of defamation against Chris Kyle?
(See Jury Instruction Nos. 8, 8A, 8B, 8C.)"46 The district court's
introductory jury instruction on defamation notes Ventura's claims that
he was defamed by Kyle when he asserted in his book, on television, and
radio, "that Mr. Ventura said "he hates America," the SEALs "were
killing men and women and children and murdering," and the SEALs
'deserve to lose a few."'"
The remaining part of the introductory
defamation instruction set out the elements of the defamation claim,
including the requirement that Mr. Kyle's story about Mr. Ventura had to
be defamatory."
This resulted in some jury confusion at trial. After it began deliberations
the jury asked the district court:
In jury instruction #8, when referring to Mr. Ventura's
story (Punching Out Scruff Face) is the "story" the subchapter or the 3 lines? ("he hates America," "we're killing
men & women and children and murdering," "deserve to
lose a few")." 4 9
Ventura's attorney argued in a conference in chambers that it was
necessary to "focus on what the jury's question was. Their question is: 'is
the story the subchapter or the 3 lines?' The answer to that is, obviously,
it's the whole story. It's not three lines of a story.""o The trial court
agreed."

Verdict Form, Question 1, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729676 2014 WL 3729681
(D. Minn. July 29, 2014) (No. 12-0472). Jury instructions 8A, 8B, and 8C are the jury
instructions on the elements of a defamation claim. Minnesota's pattern special verdict
form covering libel claims by public figures breaks down the elements of a defamation
claim into separate special verdict questions. See 4 MINN. PRAC. SERIES, CIVSVF
50.93 (6th ed. 2014).
1 Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 8, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686.
48
Id.
4 Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law or a New Trial, Part II., B., 2, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL
5018930 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2014) (No. 12-0472).
50
Id.
51
d.
46
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The district court's response to the jury's question was that:
"The story," as used in Instruction No. 8 (and other
Instructions), refers to the statements Mr. Kyle made
about Mr. Ventura in the Punching Out Scruff Face
subchapter and on television and radio, which include the
three statements identified in your question. You are
instructed to consider each element of Instruction No. 8 as
to the story as a whole.52
This was consistent with Magistrate Judge Boylan's earlier ruling that the
story as a whole had to be considered, rather than just the individual
statements. 53
Ventura argued in his reply to the defendant's trial brief that:
Ventura's complaint is that his reputation has been
damaged by publication of the fabricated story told in the
Scruff Face sub-chapter, and by media interviews in
which Kyle repeated the story. Ventura is not claiming,
and has never claimed, that his reputation has been
damaged by individual words and phrases taken out of
their context and viewed in isolation. Because it is the
story, as a whole, that is defamatory, the jury cannot be
asked to consider isolated words and phrases apart from
their context.
The clarifying instruction told the jury that the "story" as used in the jury
instructions included both the subchapter and Kyle's comments on it on
television and radio, and that the "story" included the three statements
noted in the instruction on defamation. Jury instruction 8 initially stated
that "Plaintiff Jesse Ventura claims that Chris Kyle defamed him by
asserting in American Sniper, as well as on television and radio, that Mr.
52

Id. (footnote omitted).

See Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Reply to Defendant's Trial Brief, Part A, Ventura v.
Kyle, No. 12-0472, 2014 WL 3729676 (D. Minn. May 5, 2014).
5
1 Id. (emphasis supplied). Ventura's brief cited Hannan v. Heartland Food Co., 614
N.W.2d 236, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) for the proposition that "Whether a
defamatory meaning is conveyed is dependent upon how an ordinary person
understands 'the language used in the light of surrounding circumstances."') (quoting
Gadach v. Benton County Co-op Ass 'n, 53 N.W.2d 230, 232 (Minn. 1952)).
51
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Ventura said 'he hates America,' the SEALs 'were killing men and
women and children and murdering,' and the SEALs "deserve to lose a
few.'-"
The variance between the district court's initial defamation instruction,
which focused on the three specific statements, and the remaining
defamation instructions, which focused on the story, was confusing.
Focusing on the story as a whole means that a jury could find that the
story as a whole was false, even if some or all of the statements Kyle
attributed to Ventura were true. It might have concluded, for example,
that Ventura made the three statements, but that other parts of the story,
including the encounter between Kyle and Ventura, and the punch that
Kyle said knocked Ventura down were falsified.
On the other hand, the order of the instructions required a finding that the
story was defamatory, that it was false, and that Kyle knew or believed
the story was false, or had substantial doubts about its truth. While the
special verdict form only asked whether Ventura had established his
claim for defamation, the jury's path to answer that question, the jury
would have (should have) worked through the elements of the defamation
claim to arrive at its conclusion that the story was defamatory.
Considering the jury instructions as a whole, it is hard to argue that the
instructions were erroneous. Kyle raised the issue on appeal, but the
Eighth Circuit did not reach that issue.5 6
Nonetheless, there is a question as to whether the method of presenting
the issue to the jury could have been clarified. The jury might have been
asked to consider whether Ventura made those statements and whether
they were defamatory against the background of the events set out in the
subchapter in American Sniper.

Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 8, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686.
Brief of Appellant at 24, 26-27, Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 143876). Had the Eighth Circuit reached the issue it seems unlikely that the court would
have reversed on that basis. Trial judges have wide latitude in framing instructions.
See Reed v. Malone's Mech., Inc., 765 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir. 2014); McCoy v.
Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 593 F.3d 737, 744 (8th Cir. 2010). This case is a
good example of why. See Reed v. Malone's Mech., Inc., 765 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir.
2014); McCoy v. Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc., 593 F.3d 737, 744 (8th Cir.20 10).
5

56
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Generally, courts, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and treatise writers
take the position in defamation cases that statements alleged to be
defamatory must be considered in light of the context of the work in
which the statements appear." As the Restatement (Second) of Torts
notes, "[t]he context of a defamatory imputation includes all parts of the
communication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.""
Conveying that law to the jury is another issue. The jury instruction could
have explained more simply the importance of context in determining
whether a statement is defamatory. Arizona's pattern instruction provides
an example of how it might have been explained to the jury:
A statement is defamatory if it tends to bring [Name of
Plaintiff] into disrepute, contempt or ridicule, or to
impeach [Name of Plaintiff]'s honesty, integrity, virtue, or
reputation. The defamatory nature of the statement is
determined by the natural and probable effect a reading of
the entire [statement, publication, or broadcast] in context
would have on the mind of the average [reader or
hearer].59
The key point is that context has to be considered in determining whether
a communication is defamatory (and false). A clearer jury instruction on
the issue would have told the jury to simply consider the allegedly
" See, e.g., Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying Massachusetts
law); Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enterprises Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 181 (2d Cir. 2000)
(applying New York law); Biro v. Conde Nast, 883 F.Supp.2d 441, 457 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (applying New York law); Miracle v. New Yorker Magazine, 190 F. Supp.2d
1192, 1199 (D. Haw. 2001) (applying Hawaiian law); Clawsonv. St. Louis PostDispatch, L.L.C., 906 A.2d 308 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006); Solaia Technology, LLC v.
Specialty Publishing Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 39 (Ill. 2006); McKee v. Laurion, 825, 725,
731 (Minn. 2013); Schlieman v. Gannett Minnesota Broadcasting, Inc., 637 N.W.2d
297, 304 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 978 (N.J. 1994);
Musser v. Smith Protective Services, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Tex. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1977) ("In
determining the meaning of a communication, words, whether written or spoken, are
to be construed together with their context."); ROBERT D. SACK, 1 SACK ON
DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2.4.2[A], at 2-20 - 2-21
(4th ed. 2012) ("Particular words must be read in the context of the communication as
a whole").
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 563 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1977).
59 ARIZONA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL, Defamation 2 (2014).
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defamatory statements in context.
3. Burden of Proof
Public figures and officials are required to prove a false and defamatory
communication, but also that the communication was made with "actual
malice," which has to be established by clear and convincing evidence.6 0
There was a dispute in the case as to whether both falsity and actual
malice had to be proven by clear and convincing evidence, or only the
actual malice element. There was also a dispute over the definition of
actual malice.
Kyle argued throughout the case that the clear and convincing evidence
standard should also apply to the falsity issue, and that the evidence was
insufficient to meet the higher standard.6 1 The trial court rejected the
argument that the clear and convincing evidence standard applied to the
falsity issue because of the lack of any binding Supreme Court, Eighth
Circuit, or Minnesota authority on the issue, 62 instead instructing the jury
on both the preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing
evidence standards.6 3 The court applied the preponderance of the
evidence standard to the falsity issue6 4 and the clear and convincing
evidence standard to the actual malice issue.65 The district court also
concluded that the evidence was sufficient to meet the higher standard.6 6
The Supreme Court bypassed the burden of proof issue in Harte-Hanks
Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton.67 The state and federal cases vary
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or
a New Trial, Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-cv-0472, 2014 WL 4425622 (D. Minn. Sept. 4
2014); Brief of Appellant at 37-39, Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 143876).
62 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1012.
63 Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 7, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686.
The district
court also concluded that the evidence on the falsity issue was sufficient to meet the
clear and convincing burden of proof. Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 n. 1.
64 Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686 at No. 8B.
65
1d. at No. 8C.
66 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1007
n.1.
67 Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2 (1989).
The
Court noted that " [t]here is some debate as to whether the element of falsity must be
established by clear and convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence,
but expressed no view on the issue.
60
61
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in their treatment of the issue.68 Courts may conclude that the plaintiff
must prove falsity of the defamatory communication by a preponderance
of the evidence6 9 or by clear and convincing evidence. 0 Or, they may
conclude that a plaintiff bears the burden of proving all elements of a
defamation claim by clear and convincing evidence." Still others
recognize the split in authority without reaching the issue. 2 The analysis
in many of the opinions is conclusory.
The argument in favor of applying the preponderance standard turns
primarily on the lack of a Supreme Court holding on the issue. 3 The
argument in favor of the clear and convincing evidence standard is set out
in DiBella v. Hopkins," a Second Circuit decision applying New York
See Daniel William Weininger, Note, "We Express No View On This Issue": The
Standardof Prooffor the Element of FalsityIn A New York Public Official/Figure
DefamationAction, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 455 (2007).
69 In Rattray v. City of Nat'l City, 51 F.3d 793, 801 (9th Cir. 1994), the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the clear and convincing evidence standard did not apply to the falsity
element of a defamation claim. Judge Hug, dissenting, argued that the clear and
convincing evidence standard should apply to the falsity element to avoid the same
chilling effect the Supreme Court sought to avoid in applying the higher standard of
proof to the actual malice issue. Id. at 804 (Hug, J., dissenting).
71 See Phillips v. Ingham County, 371 F.Supp.2d 918 (W.D. Mich. 2005) (applying
Michigan law, holding that clear and convincing evidence standard applies to falsity
element).
71 Pritt v. Republican Nat'l Comm., 557 S.E.2d 853, 862-63 (W. Va. 2001) (following
Miller, J.'s dissenting opinion in Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co., 423 S.E.2d 560, 590
(W. Va. 1992)).
72 See Gleasonv. Smolinski, 125 A.3d 920, 957 n. 44 (Conn. 2015) (noting the
division in authority without deciding the issue). In Nevada Indep. Broad. Corp. v.
Allen, 664 P.2d 337 (1983), the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the burden of proof
on the falsity issue is unclear. Id. at 343. In a footnote, the court noted the division of
authority on the issue, but observed, without further explanation, that "[p]ractically
speaking, it may be impossible to apply a higher standard to 'actual malice' than to the
issue of falsity." Id. at 343 n. 5. That observation is similar to the court's in Robertson.
Robertson v. McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241, 248 (D.D.C. 1987).
73 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 341 (2d Cir. 1969) (concluding that
the Supreme Court only changed the burden of proof with respect to the actual malice
requirement, not the other elements of a defamation claim).
7 403 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2005) (predicting New York law), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 939
(2005). The Minnesota Supreme Court has not addressed whether the common law
requires a public figure to prove falsity by clear-and-convincing evidence or a mere
preponderance. The U.S. Supreme Court, after noting a split in authority, avoided
deciding the issue of whether the First Amendment requires it. Harte-Hanks Commc
'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2 (1989). The Eighth Circuit has not
68
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law. The court concluded that the majority of courts to consider the issue
have applied the higher standard of review to the falsity issue. The
rationale for the higher standard is threefold. One is that a rule favoring
the higher standard of care is more speech protective. A second is that
plaintiffs who are public figures effectively already bear the higher
burden of proof because the issue of falsity is subsumed in the actual
malice requirement that the defamatory communication was made with
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. A third is
that instructing a jury that the plaintiff has to prove falsity by a
preponderance of the evidence, but must prove actual malice by clear and
convincing evidence, is likely to result in confusion and error."
The Eighth Circuit did not reach the issue on appeal. 6 The court
commented on the issue in a footnote, however, noting "the
complications that can arise when a general verdict form is used in pubicfigure defamation cases."7 The alternative, a special verdict form, would
break the defamation claim into its elements, requiring separate findings
on the defamation, falsity, and actual malice issues.
4. ActualMalice
There are at least two issued relating to the actual malice standard, which
is part of a public figure plaintiff s burden of proof in establishing a right
to recover for defamation. There are lingering questions concerning the
proper standard for actual malice and in drafting appropriate jury
instructions that will make the standard comprehensible for juries.
a. The Actual Malice Standard
The Supreme Court applied the First Amendment to a defamation case
for the first time in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.7 ' The Court
decided the issue. But most jurisdictions addressing the issue hold that public figures
must prove falsity by clear-and-convincing evidence. See, e.g., DiBella v. Hopkins,
403 F.3d 102, 110-15 (2d Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); Brokers' Choice of Am., Inc.
v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 2014); see also R. SACK, SACK
ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS

§ 3:4 at 3-14 to -15 & n.

52 (4th ed. 2010 & Supp. 2013).
75
Id. at 114 (quoting Robertsonv. McCloskey, 666 F. Supp. 241, 248 (D.D.C.1987)).
76 Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d 876, 802 n. 4. (8th Cir. 2016).
7 Id. at 886 n. 8. The court cites as examples Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970) and West v. Media Gen. Operations, Inc., 120 Fed. Appx. 601,
602, 619 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (collecting cases).
78 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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established a First Amendment baseline that precludes recovery by public
officials for false and defamatory statements relevant to their conduct in
office unless the officials establish actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. 9
The actual malice standard requires proof that a defamatory
communication was made "with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 80 The Supreme Court
has variously defined reckless disregard to mean publication with
"serious doubts" about the truth of the communication" or publication
with a "high degree of awareness . .. of probable falsity," 82 but the Court
has also noted that there is no single, "infallible definition" of the term." 83
The Court has suggested that one of the definitions should be used in lieu
of the use of the term "actual malice," to avoid jury confusion."
b. Actual Malice - Jury Instructions
Federal and state pattern jury instructions are generally consistent in
defining the term "actual malice" to mean publication with knowledge of
its falsity or reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.8 5 The term
"reckless disregard" may or not be further defined in pattern instructions.
If it is, it is typically defined as publication with serious doubts as to the
truth of the publication.8 6

" Id. at 279-280. The Court drew the standard from the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908), which enunciated a rule
that several state courts had adopted. The standard in Coleman was based on the free
press provision in the Kansas Constitution. Id. at 283.
80

Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.

1

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
Connaughton, 491 U.S. at 667 (quoting Thompson, 390 U.S. at 730).
Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc. 501 U.S. 496, 511 (1991).

82
83
8

85

E.g, 3 FED. JURY PRAC. AND INSTR. § 124.11 (6th ed. 2015) ("A publication is made
with "actual malice," as that term is used in this charge, if it is made with knowledge
that it is false, or with reckless disregard of whether it is false or not"); DEL. P.J.I. CIV.

§ 11.16 (2000) ("A publication is made with "actual malice" if it is made with
knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard for whether it is false"); VA. PRAC.
JURY INSTR. § 48.15 (2015) ("'Actual malice' is that malice that shows that a statement
was made with knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it is false
or not").
86

E.g., JOSEPH D. LIPCHITZ & JOHN F. Nucci, MASS. SUPER. CT. CIV. PRAC. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, § 6.3.1 (2014) ("'Reckless disregard' means that the defendant or the
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Ventura's requested instruction was drawn from the Eighth Circuit" and
Minnesota" pattern jury instructions on actual malice. The requested
instruction read as follows:
In a defamation suit, it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the allegedly defamatory
statement or communication was published with actual
malice. A statement or communication is published with
"actual malice" if the person who publishes it knew it was
false or had serious doubts about its truth. "Clear and
convincing evidence" means it is highly probable that the
statement was published with actual malice. Put another
way, you must firmly believe that the defendant published
the statement with actual malice.89
In contrast, Kyle's requested jury instruction on actual malice was quite
detailed:
The third thing that Jesse Ventura must prove is that Chris
Kyle made his January 2012 statements (that Jesse
Ventura made offensive statements at the Michael
Monsoor wake on October 12, 2006, including the
"deserve to lose a few" statement) with actual knowledge
that they were false or with a high degree of subjective
awareness that they probably were false.
Ventura must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the allegedly defamatory statements were made with
actual knowledge that they were false or with a high
defendant's agent entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication"); MINN.
DIST. JUDGES Ass'N, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE - CIVIL, CIVSVF 50.93 (6th ed. 2014)

("actual malice" is defined in part as publication with "serious doubts about its truth");
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
FOR CIVIL CASES, No. 806.85 (2018) ("Reckless disregard means that, at the time of
the publication, the defendant had serious doubts about whether the statement was
true") (footnote omitted).
COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF MODEL CIV. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE EIGHT CIR. § 3.04 (2013).
88 MINN. DIST. JUDGES Ass'N, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDE - CIVIL, CIVJIG 50.40 (6th
8

ed. 2014) (modified).
89

Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions, Instruction 18, Ventura v. Kyle, (D. Minn.

Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 12-0472 27) (footnotes omitted).
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degree of subjective awareness that they probably were
false.o
Knowledge that the statement was false means that Chris
Kyle actually knew that he was saying something that was
untrue.
A high degree of subjective awareness that statements
probably were false is shown if Kyle actually recognized
that the statement was probably false, but went ahead and
made it anyway, ignoring that it was probably false.
That Chris Kyle was or might have been careless in
making the statements does not constitute subjective
awareness of probable falsity. Chris Kyle's conduct is not
to be measured by whether a reasonably prudent person
would have made the challenged statements, or would
have been more careful in how the statement was worded,
or would have investigated more before making the
challenged statements.
Disapproval, ill will, prejudice, hostility or contempt do
not by themselves amount to knowledge of falsity or
awareness of probable falsity. Evidence that a party or a
witness had a lapse in memory regarding one event while
he clearly recalls other events is not implausible, nor does
it demonstrate that he knew his statement was false or
probably false. Anyone with a less-than-perfect memory
will recall some things precisely and other things in a
fog. 9 0
The proposed instruction was cobbled together from various sources. The
actual malice standard in the proposed instruction appears to be based
primarily on Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., which notes that a
"high degree of awareness of . . . probably falsity" is necessary to
establish reckless disregard. 91 The Supreme Court has equated the serious
Defendant's Revisions to Selected Proposed Jury Instructions at 4, Ventura, 2014
WL 8721598 (footnotes omitted).
91 Masson, 501 U.S. at 510.
90
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doubt half of the standard with "subjective awareness of probable
falsity."9 2 In St. Amant v. Thompson, the Court stated that "reckless
conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would
have published, or would have investigated before publishing," and that
"[t]here must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication." 9 3 Niska v. Clayton, an unpublished Minnesota Court of
Appeals decision, was the basis for part of the penultimate sentence and
the last sentence of the instruction.9 4
The instruction the trial court gave was considerably shorter than Kyle's
requested instruction. It also differed from Ventura's requested
instruction. Without using the term "actual malice," the court instructed
the jury that:
The third element is that Mr. Kyle published the story
about Mr. Ventura despite:
1. Knowing the story was false; or
2. Believing the story was false; or
3. Having serious doubts about the story's truth.95
There was some jury confusion about the instructions. Two questions
were raised, one by the full jury during deliberations and one by an
individual juror after the jury deadlocked. During its initial deliberations,
the jury asked for guidance on the meaning of "serious doubt." 96 Kyle
argued in his post-trial motion 97 forjudgment as a matter of law or a new
trial and on appeal9 8 that the trial court should have instructed the jury

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 334 n.6.
Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731.
9 Niska v. Clayton, No. A13-0622, 2014 WL 902680 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 10,
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1399 (2015). The case involved the application of
MINN. STAT. § 21 1B.06, subd. 1(a) (2014) (held unconstitutional in 281 Care
Committee v. Ameson, 766 F.3d 774, 785 (8th Cir. 2014)).
95 Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686, at *5.
96 Brief of Appellant at 9-10, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686.
97 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
or a New Trial at 13, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 4425622 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2014)
(No. 12-cv-0472).
98 Brief of Appellant at 5, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686.
92

93
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that "serious doubt" means a "high degree" of "awareness of probable
falsity."
The trial court instead told the jury that there was no legal definition of
the term "serious doubt" and that they would have to "rely on [their]
common sense in interpreting and applying the standard." 9 9 The trial
court was undoubtedly correct in telling the jury that there was no legal
definition of "serious doubt." The circularity of the definitions of
"reckless disregard" and "serious doubt" establish that.100
The court responded to the second question by referring the jury to
instructions 8 through 8C, the defamation instructions. 01 The juror's
question about whether the jury had "to believe that Kyle thought he was
telling the truth" may well have been prompted by the second part of the
third element of jury instruction 8C. The focus of the Supreme Court
decisions on actual malice and the pattern jury instructions does not
include the "belief' element. While the issue of belief in the truth of the
defamatory matter was relevant at common law to a determination of
whether there was actual malice sufficient to overcome conditional
privileges, the focus, post-Sullivan, is on whether the defamatory
communication was made with knowledge of its falsity or with serious
doubts about its truth. 102

Brief and Addendum of Appellant at 45-47, Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016)
(No. 14-3876).
100 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
101 See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
102 Before Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), proof of malice necessary to overcome
a
conditional privilege meant that the defendant must have made the defamatory
statement with an improper motive, which turned on "the intent or purpose with which
the publication was made, the belief of the defendant in the truth of his statement, or
upon the ill will which the defendant might have borne toward the plaintiff." Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 164-65 (1979). That approach was adopted in section 600 of
the Restatement of Torts, which provided that a conditional privilege was abused if the
person publishing a false and defamatory communication did "not believe in the truth
of the defamatory matter." A conditional privilege was abused under section 601 of
the person making the person publishing the false and defamatory communication
"although believing the defamatory communication to be true" did not have reasonable
grounds for that belief. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 600, 601 (Am. Law Inst.1938).
Section 600 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts combined those two
sections of the Restatement of Torts. It provides that a conditional privilege is
overcome if the person publishing the defamatory communication does so knowing
9
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Belief is irrelevant to the issue of whether Kyle knew the story was false.
Either he knew it was false or he didn't. Belief might be seen as the flip
side of whether he had serious doubts about the truth of the story. If he
believed it was true, he might not have serious doubts about the truth of
the story. If so, there is no need to use both in a jury instruction because
it would prompt a jury to look for different answers to the same question.
Also, in some cases, there could be doubts about the truth of a story, but
the evidence is nonetheless sufficient to justify publication because of
corroborating evidence, even in the face of those doubts.10 3
5. Damages
Ventura alleged in his original complaint that "[a]s a direct result of
Kyle's publication of knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously false and
defamatory statements," his "reputation and standing in the community,
including Minnesota and the United States, has been harmed, he has been
embarrassed and humiliated, and he has suffered emotional distress."104
He also alleged that:
Kyle's publication of knowingly, intentionally and
maliciously false and defamatory statements has
negatively affected, and will continue to negatively affect
Governor Ventura in connection with his businesses and
professions, including but not limited to his current and
future opportunities as a political candidate, political
commentator, author, speaker, television host and
that it is false or "acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
A comment to section 600 of the Second Restatement notes that at common law the
traditional balance was achieved by imposing strict liability for a defamatory
communication only if the defendant "did not believe the statement to be true or
lacked reasonable grounds for so believing." Id. cmt. a.
The Reporter's Note to the section explains that the combined section has shifted the
focus from the issue of whether the defendant believed in the truth of the defamatory
matter or had reasonable grounds for believing it was true, to a standard that asks
whether the defendant knew the defamatory communication was false, or acted in
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Id. reporter's note. "Belief' is excised from the
black letter statement.
103 E.g., Jackson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 15 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) ("A healthy skepticism is a normal part of a reputable journalist's makeup and
leads him or her to obtain corroborating evidence to back up a source's story.").
104 Complaint, paragraph 42, Ventura v. Kyle, No. E 0:12-cv-00472-RHK-JJG.
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personality, and all other commercial endeavors that
involve exploitation of his name, likeness and public

persona. 105
He sought to recover for presumed damages, including injury to
reputation and emotional harm, as well as for economic loss caused by
the defamatory communication.
The case raised several issues concerning his right to recover damages
for emotional harm. Kyle contested Ventura's right to recover damages
for emotional distress, as well as his evidence of diminished reputation. 106
and Ventura contested Kyle's proof of Ventura's diminished
reputation. 107
Injury to reputation is generally presumed in libel casesos and in
defamation claims by public officials, 109 figures, 110 or in cases involving
public issues,"' once New York Times actual malice is established.
A key question in any defamation case concerns the plaintiffs burden of
establishing damages, not only for injury to reputation, but also for
emotional harm caused by the defamatory communication. Injury to
reputation is generally presumed in libel cases. 112 In defamation claims
by public officials,1 13 figures,11 4 or in cases involving public issues,1 15
there no First Amendment impediment to the award of presumed
105 Id.
at paragraph 43.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion In Limine to Exclude Certain
Evidence not Properly Admissible With Regard to Plaintiff's Reputation at 2-3,
Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729659 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 12-cv-0472).
107 Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Memorandum in Support of Motion In limine to Exclude
David A. Schultz From Testifying as an Expert Witness for the Defense and to
Confirm the Exclusion of Robert G. Meekins as A Defense Expert, Ventura v. Kyle,
2014 WL 3729652 (D. Minn. Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 12-0472).
108 W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.2d 1148, 1154 (N.J. 2012).
109 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 283-84.
110 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
...
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-61 (1985)
(plurality).
112 W.J.A., 43 A.2d at 1154.
113 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80, 283-84.
106

114 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
115

Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 756-6 1.
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damages, once New York Times actual malice is established. While
damages may be presumed, nothing precludes the plaintiff from
attempting to prove actual injury to reputation. On the other hand,
evidence that a plaintiff already had a bad reputation may tend to establish
that an additional defamatory communication would not result in any
increased harm.1 16
In contrast, the plaintiff has the burden of pleading"' and proving special
damages."' A plaintiff seeking to recover for special damages has to
show the loss of something of pecuniary value.1 19 It may include various
sorts of losses, such as loss of a contract, a loss of earnings, credit, or
employment.120
a. Damagesfor EmotionalHarm
Under applicable state and federal law Ventura was entitled to presumed
damages for emotional harm upon proof that the statements were false
and defamatory and made with actual malice.121 The claim for emotional

'1

See ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
§ 10.5.5[B] (4th ed. 2012).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(g).

118

See

116

PROBLEMS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§§ 575, 622 (1977). The defamatory

communication must the "legal cause" of the special harm to the plaintiff. Id. § 622A.
It is a legal cause if it was a "substantial factor" in causing the harm. Id. § 622A (a).
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 575 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
120 DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE § 9:3 (West Supp. 2016);
2
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 9.35 (2d ed. 2013).
121 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343. Minnesota law permits presumed damages
in libel
cases. Mike Steenson, Presumed Damages in Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1492, 1511-12 (2014). In Richie v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 21, 26
(Minn. 1996). However, the Minnesota Supreme Court restricted the right of a private
plaintiff involved in a public issue to recover damages by limiting the right to recover
damages for emotional distress to cases in which the plaintiff is able to establish actual
injury to reputation, at least when the plaintiff is unable to establish actual malice.
While it is clear that Gertz permits recovery of actual damages, including damages for
emotional distress, see Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 46 (1976) (recovery
permitted for emotional distress absent proof of actual injury to reputation in libel case
involving a public issue), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that as a matter of
Minnesota law a plaintiff involved in a public issue who brings suit against a media
defendant has to prove actual injury to reputation in order to recover damages for
emotional distress. Richie was inapplicable in Ventura's case, however, because he
established actual malice, entitling him to presumed damages.
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harm was a hotly contested issue.
Kyle argued in his trial brief that Ventura should not allowed to recover
damages for emotional harm. Rather than producing his medical records,
Ventura stipulated to the removal of any reference to "mental distress"
and "emotional distress" or, as argued in the trial brief, "variations of
those terms" as noted in Ventura's complaint. The brief acknowledged,
however, that the stipulation did not affect Ventura's "continuing
allegations regarding humiliation, embarrassment, harm to his reputation
and standing in the community, or regarding negative effects in
connection with Plaintiff s business and professions."1 22
Kyle nonetheless argued that the lack of medical support for Ventura's
claim for "mental/emotional distress" was significant, because
"Minnesota law does not permit recovery of such damages in the absence
of reliable evidence,"1 23 and that plaintiffs seeking recovery for those
damages must "offer medical proof of physical manifestations of alleged
mental distress or anguish." 12 4 Building on that proposition, Kyle argued
that Ventura would "have a difficult time distinguishing damages for
'mental distress' and 'emotional distress,' which he has withdrawn, from
damages for 'humiliation, embarrassment' which he continues to
assert."

125

The supporting authority for that argument1 26 was drawn from Minnesota
Court of Appeals cases involving claims for emotional distress, but those
claims were not parallel to Ventura's claim for emotional harm. The cases
involved claims for promissory estoppel, 127 negligent infliction of
Defendant's Trial Brief at 11, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729664 (D. Minn. Apr.
21, 2014) (No. 12-cv-0472).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125
122

126

Id. at 12.

Id. (citing Deli v. Univ. of Minn., 578 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998); Soucek
v. Banham, 503 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Copeland v. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc., No. C7-97-733, 1997 WL 729195 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 1997)).
127 Deli, 578 N.W.2d at 779. The plaintiff, the women's gymnastics coach at the
University, brought suit against the University for breach of the athletic director's oral
promise not to view a videotape containing not only the performance of the
gymnastics team but also of her sexual encounter with her husband in a hotel room.
The court of appeals held that absent an independent tort claim the plaintiff could not
recover damages for emotional harm under a promissory estoppel theory, but that even
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Those cases are inapposite for two

reasons.
First, Minnesota law seems clear in holding that a plaintiff is entitled to
recover for presumed damages in libel cases, and that presumed damages
include damages for mental suffering.13 0 Kyle did not dispute that point,
although Kyle argued that Ventura's right to recover damages for any
emotional harm was foreclosed by his stipulation to withdraw his claims
for mental distress.1 31 Second, claims for emotional harm in libel cases
need not be supported by physical symptoms or medical evidence. The
Minnesota Supreme Court cases on that issue are clear. 13 2
if those damages were allowable the plaintiff's evidence, the lack of medical evidence
supporting the claim would preclude recover for those damages. Id. at 783-84.
128 Banham, 503 N.W.2d at 153. The plaintiff sued police officers and
the City of

Minneapolis for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out the death of his
dog, which was shot to death by the officers. The court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to recover for emotional distress because Minnesota requires the person
seeking to recover under that theory to prove that he is in the zone of danger and
reasonably feared for his own safety, or is able to show "a direct invasion of his rights,
such as defamation, malicious prosecution, or other willful, wanton or malicious
conduct." Id. at 163.
129

Copeland, No. C7-97-733, 1997 WL 729195. Defendant news room employee of

the defendant, accompanied a veterinarian who was being investigated by the
defendant's news station, to the plaintiffs' home. She asked to accompany the vet
because she was interested in becoming a veterinary technician. The Copelands sued
the defendants for trespass. The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the
trespass claim, holding that the plaintiffs could not recover damages for their
emotional harm caused by the trespass. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
plaintiffs were required to show physical symptoms arising out of the trespass, but that
the evidence was insufficient to justify the claim. Id. at *4 -*5.
130 Thorsonv. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 251 N.W. 177, 179 (Minn. 1933) ("Mental
suffering is an element of general damage. Such suffering is presumed to have
naturally resulted from the publication of a libelous article.").
131 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of
"Mental Distress" and "Emotional Distress," Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729678 (D.
Minn. Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 12-cv-0472).
132 In Lickteig v. Alderson, Ondov, Leonard & Sween, P.A., 556 N.W.2d 557, 560
(Minn. 1996) (citations omitted), the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that:
In tort cases, emotional distress may be an element of damages in only three
circumstances. First, a plaintiff who suffers a physical injury as a result of
another's negligence may recover for the accompanying mental anguish...
Second, a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when physical symptoms arise after and because of emotional distress, if the
plaintiff was actually exposed to physical harm as a result of the negligence
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b. PresumedDamages - Jury Instructions
The jury instructions on presumed damages in the case raised two issues.
First, if Ventura withdrew his claims for mental distress, there was still
an issue as to whether he should nonetheless be entitled to recover for
other emotional harm, including humiliation and embarrassment. Second,
there was an issue as to whether the instructions should in some way
constrain the jury's discretion to award presumed damages.
Ventura's requested instruction on presumed damages was a slightly
modified version of Minnesota's pattern instruction on the issue:
The only question for you to decide [in answering
Question _] is the amount of money plaintiff is entitled
to receive for:
1. Harm to his reputation and standing in the
community
2. Humiliation
3. Embarrassment
4. Economic loss caused by the defamatory
statements or communication
No evidence of actual harm is required.1 33
Ventura requested the following instruction on presumed damages:
Jesse Ventura is seeking to recover against Chris Kyle's
Estate what the law calls "presumed damages."
No definite standard or method of calculation is
prescribed by law by which to fix reasonable
compensation for presumed damages, and no evidence of
actual harm is required. Nor is the opinion of any witness
required as to the amount of reasonable compensation. In
of another (the "zone-of-danger" rule)... Finally, a plaintiff may recover
emotional distress damages when there has been a "direct invasion of the
plaintiffs rights such as that constituting slander, libel, malicious prosecution,
seduction, or other like willful, wanton, or malicious conduct."
133 Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions, No. 28, Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-0472 27 (D.
Minn. Apr. 21, 2014) (12-cv-0472). Minnesota's pattern instruction is 4 MINN. PRAC.
SERIES, CIVJIG 50.55 (6th ed. 2014).
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making an award of presumed damages you shall exercise
your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable in the light
of the evidence.
In determining an award of presumed damages in this
case, you must not include any amount for emotional
distress or mental distress. Ventura is not seeking these
types of damages.
Presumed damages are permitted because in some cases
injury to reputation may be difficult of monetary proof,
but presumed damages nonetheless are intended to be an
approximate compensation for real injury. Presumed
damages are intended as some estimate, however rough,
of the probable degree of actual loss that a person will
suffer given the particular charge against him, even
though the loss cannot be identified in money terms. You
are not required to award presumed damages, and you may
consider any evidence that may exist that Ventura did not
suffer any damages. If you find that Ventura has not
suffered any actual injury to reputation as a result of the
challenged book passage, then you should not award
presumed damages.
Presumed damages are not intended to punish Chris Kyle
or his Estate for making the challenged statements and are
not intended to deter or prevent others from making
similar statements in the future.13 4
The proposed instruction is lengthy but generally accurate.
The third paragraph states that the jury is not to award damages for
"emotional or mental distress." That was a debatable point, in light of
Ventura's stipulation that he would not seek to recover damages for
mental or emotional distress.

134 Defendant's Revisions to Selected Proposed Jury Instructions, Ventura, 2014 WL
8721598.
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The next to the last sentence of the instruction states that the jury may not
award presumed damages unless Ventura suffered "actual injury to
reputation as a result of the challenged book passage." That part of the
requested instruction would have been accurate had Ventura not been a
public figure, but if he established that the statement was defamatory, and
that it was made with knowledge of the falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth, presumed damagers would be recoverable, absent additional
state law restrictions. There are none. 1 3 5
The district court's jury instruction on damages for Ventura's defamation
claim tracked Minnesota's pattern instruction, as requested by Ventura.
It did not restrict Ventura from recovering for humiliation and
embarrassment, although it does not specifically include damages for
mental distress:
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of
defamation, you may presume he has suffered damages
and award him the amount of money you determine he is
entitled to receive for harm to his reputation and standing
in the community, humiliation, and embarrassment. No
evidence of actual harm is required for you to award him
these damages. 1 36

In Richie, 544 N.W.2d at 26, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court restricted the
right of a private plaintiff involved in a public issue to recover damages by limiting the
right to recover damages for emotional distress to cases in which the plaintiff is able to
establish actual injury to reputation, at least when the plaintiff is unable to establish
actual malice. While it is clear that Gertz permits recovery of actual damages,
including damages for emotional distress, see Firestone, 424 U.S. at 482-83 (recovery
permitted for emotional distress absent proof of actual injury to reputation in libel case
involving a public issue), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that as a matter of
Minnesota law a plaintiff involved in a public issue who brings suit against a media
defendant has to prove actual injury to reputation in order to recover damages for
emotional distress. The court clearly recognized that its holding was inapplicable in
cases where a public figure establishes actual malice. Richie at 26 (" In a case such as
this, where the defamatory statements were made by the media, involved a matter of
public concern, and there have been no allegations of actual malice, recovery cannot
be based on presumed damages"). Richie was inapplicable in Ventura's case because
Ventura established actual malice, entitling him to presumed damages.
136 Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 12, Ventura v. Kyle, WL 3729686.
135
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Kyle prevailed on the mental distress issue, but not the argument that any
emotional harm that might be categorized as mental distress should not
be recoverable. The instructions clearly permitted Ventura to recover for
humiliation and embarrassment, however. Both types of injuries are
emotional responses to the defamatory communication.
The jury instruction, coupled with the special verdict question on
defamation damages, raises additional issues. Question No. 2 on the
verdict form asked:
What amount of money, if any, will fairly and adequately
compensate Plaintiff Jesse Ventura for damages directly
caused by the defamation? (See Jury Instruction Nos. 12
and 13 for the means of determining damages.) 13 7
The instruction on presumed damages states that the jury may award
damages without evidence of actual harm. There were no limitations on
the instruction along the lines suggested by Kyle ("[p]resumed damages
are intended as some estimate, however rough, of the probable degree of
actual loss that a person will suffer"), which raises questions concerning
whether and how presumed damages can be subject to reasonable
limitations and how to convey that concept to a jury.
There is generally a disconnect between the acknowledgment that
presumed damages should be an approximation of the damages that
would ordinarily flow from the defamatory communication and jury
instructions that actually impose boundaries on presumed damages.
The district court's instruction did not limit presumed damages, but the
special verdict question on defamation damages did in asking the jury to
determine what amount of money would fairly and adequately
compensate Ventura "for damages directly caused by the defamation."
Incorporation of the causation requirement imposed a limitation that is
inconsistent with the concept of presumed damages. Some of these
problems are illustrated in a Minnesota saga, Longbehn v. Schoenrock,13 8

Question No. 2, Verdict Fon, Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-472 (D. Minn. July 29,
2014).
138 Schoenrock was an appellant in the first appeal in the case, Longbehn v. City
of
Moose Lake, No. A04-1214, 2005 WL 1153625 (Minn. Ct. App. May 17, 2005). The
137
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which involved a series of trials and appeals over a twelve-year period,
cases in which the presumed damages problem was pivotal.
The defamation suit arose out of a single phone call made by the
defendant to a third person, during the course of which he referred to the
plaintiff, a police officer, as "Pat the Pedophile," a sobriquet that referred
to the fact that Longbehn had dated a younger woman. That case rocked
back and forth between the trial court and court of appeals for several
years as the courts grappled with the issue of how to constrain the jury's
discretion in awarding presumed damages to the plaintiff in a case
involving "defamation per se." In the first trial of the case the jury
awarded the plaintiff $230,000 in presumed damages for past and future
harm to reputation, mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment.
Concerned about the size of the damages award, but keenly aware that
the presumed damages rule gives courts little control in determining
damages, the court of appeals applied a review standard drawn from a
comment to section 621 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
states that "in the absence of proof, general damages are limited to harm
that 'would normally be assumed to flow from a defamatory publication
of the nature involved,"139 and concluded that the award for "general
damages far exceeds the amount of past and future harm to appellant's
reputation, mental distress, humiliation, and embarrassment that would
normally flow from a publication of this kind." 14 0
On remand, the trial court, trying to accommodate the court of appeals,
was careful in attempting to establish parameters for the jury by
instructing them, in part, that:
A person is liable for the general harm which resultsfrom
the defamatory statement.
Your duty as ajury is to determine the amount of damages,
if any, that the plaintiff sustained by the defendant's use
court of appeals opinions in the second and third appeals are Longbehn v. Schoenrock,
727 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); No. A09-2141 2010 WL 3000283 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 3, 2010). For a detailed analysis of the cases see Mike Steenson, Presumed
Damagesin Defamation Law, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1492, 1523-39 (2014).
139 Schoenrock, 727 N.W.2d at 162 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621
cmt. a (1977)).
140

Id.
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of that nickname. In making your decisions, the court has
determined as a matter of law that, number one, the
defendant used the offensive nickname on one isolated
occasion....
A party askingfor damages must prove the nature, extent,
duration and consequences of his harm. You must not
decide damages based on speculation or guess.14 1
In addition, the first four special verdict form questions asked if
"Longbehn 'suffer[ed]' some form of harm 'from the Defendant's use of
the defamatory nickname. "'142
The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in giving the
highlighted parts of the instruction and in formulating its special verdict
form because they required a finding of causation, a requirement that is
inconsistent with the presumed damages rule as set out in its previous
opinion in the case. 143
The case was reversed and remanded. The trial court, which by now may
have thought it was playing whack-a-mole, instructed the jury in the
retrial as follows:
Deciding harm for defamation
The only question for you to decide is the amount of
money the Plaintiff is entitled to receive for
1. Harm to his reputation and standing in the community;
2. Mental distress;
3. Humiliation; and
4. Embarrassment
No evidence of actual harm is required.
You may base the amount of money Plaintiff if entitled to
receive on your assessment of the harm that would
normally be assumed to flow from a defamatory
publication of the nature involved here.
141 Longbehnv. Schoenrock, No. A09-2141, 2010 WL 3000283, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Aug. 3, 2010) (emphasis the court's).
1421d

Schoenrock, 727 N.W.2d at 160 (stating that where damages are presumed the
plaintiff is entitled to recover without proof that the publication caused actual harm).
143
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In your assessment of presumed general damages you may
consider: (1) the character of the Plaintiff; (2) the
Plaintiffs general standing and his reputation in the
community; (3) the character of the defamatory publiccation; (4) the extent of dissemination of the statement by
the Defendant; and (5) the extent and duration of the
circulation of the Defendant's publication. 144
The special verdict question on damages, with the jury's response, was
as follows:
1. What amount of money will fairly and adequately
compensate the Plaintiff for Defendant's use of the
defamatory nickname?
a. Harm to Plaintiffs reputation and standing in
the community $ 00.00
b. Mental distress $ 00.00
c. Humiliation $ 750.00
d. Embarrassment $ 00.00145
The court was careful in framing the question to avoid any requirement
of a causal connection between the defendant's use of the defamatory
nickname and any harm to the plaintiffs reputation or mental distress,
humiliation, and embarrassment.
The district court's jury instructions and special verdict questions in the
Ventura case would have more accurately reflected Minnesota law had
there been limitations on presumed damages and had the causal
connection required in the special verdict form been removed. Only
Ventura would have complained about that, of course, and a verdict in
his favor rendered it moot. As to the lack of limitations on presumed
damages in the instruction, the broad discretion trial courts have in
instructing juries would have made it an effectively nonappealable point.
Nonetheless, the instructions and special verdict form in the Ventura case
illustrate the inadequacies of jury instructions and special verdict
questions on the presumed damages issue. The dilemma created by the
14 Mike Steenson, PresumedDamages in Defamation Law, 40 WM.
REV.
145 1492, 1535-36 (2014).
Id. at 1536.

MITCHELL L.
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presumed damages rule, which permits damages in the absence of proof
of those damages, and the need for some boundaries in a jury's discretion
to award those damages, can be avoided. Instructions such as those in the
last trial in Longbehn v. Schoenrock illustrate that reasonable limitations
can be imposed on presumed damages without running afoul of the
contrary rule that there does not have to be proof of actual harm to justify
a damages award. 146
B. Invasion ofPrivacy - Appropriation
Section 652C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that ""[o]ne
who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another
is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy."147 Relying
on section 652C, Ventura alleged that he "has acquired a property right
in the exclusive commercial use of his own identity, as represented by his

North Carolina's pattern instruction on presumed damages in cases involving
claims for presumed damages by public figures or officials suggests a guide for juries
to follow:
The determination of the amount of presumed damages is not a task which
can be completed with mathematical precision and is one which unavoidably
includes an element of speculation. The amount of presumed damages is an
estimate, however rough, of the probable extent of actual harm, in the form of
loss of reputation or standing in the community, mental or physical pain and
suffering, and inconvenience or loss of enjoyment which the plaintiff has
suffered or will suffer in the future as a result of the defendant's publication
of the [libelous] [slanderous] statement.
NC PATTERN JURY INST. - CIV. 806.83 (June 2017).
California's Bar Association Jury Instruction is another example of a limiting
instruction:
Presumed damages are those damages that necessarily result from the
publication of defamatory matter and are presumed to exist. They include, but
are not limited to, reasonable compensation for loss of personal [or
professional] reputation, shame, mortification, and hurt feelings. No definite
standard [or method of calculation] is prescribed by law by which to fix
reasonable compensation for presumed damages, and no evidence of actual
harm is required. Nor is the opinion of any witness required as to the amount
of such reasonable compensation. In making an award for presumed damages
you shall exercise your authority with calm and reasonable judgment and the
damages you fix shall be just and reasonable.
CAL. JURY INSTR.--CIV. 7.10.1 (March 2018).
146

147

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§652C (Am. Law Inst. 1977). The Minnesota

Supreme Court adopted section 652C in 1998. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582
N.W.2d 231, 233 n.3, 236 (Minn. 1998).
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name, image, voice, photograph and public persona,""' and that "Kyle
has wrongfully appropriated and used [his] identity for his own economic
advantage and gain, including Governor Ventura's name, image and
public persona." 1 49
There is a substantial body of case law and overlapping Restatement
provisions covering the tort of appropriation, and a lack of clarity in the
law."1o Threading that law through the eye of the jury instruction needle
is made harder because of that lack of clarity. The treatment of
appropriation in the Ventura case is a good illustration of the problems.
There are several intersecting problems that have to be addressed in
understanding the tort of appropriation, including what kind of
appropriation is necessary to trigger the tort, what the defendant's
purpose has to be in appropriating the plaintiff s name or likeness, what
damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover if the appropriation is
established, when the exception for the incidental use of a plaintiffs
name or likeness applies, and what limitations the First Amendment
imposes on the right to recover for appropriation. Those recurring issues
in appropriation cases were all involved in the case.
1. Jury Instructions
The jury instructions on appropriation in the Ventura case, proposed and
given, highlight the problems involved in understanding the tort of
appropriation and in explaining the law to the jury in a comprehensible
form.
Ventura's requested jury instruction on appropriation, which was drawn
from Minnesota's pattern jury instruction, was brief and straightforward:
Invasion of privacy by appropriation occurs when a
person appropriates another person's name or likeness for
his or her own use or benefit.15 1
148 Complaint supra note 16,

149

Id. at ¶ 48.

¶ 16.

150 See Eric E. Johnson, Disentanglingthe Right ofPrivacy,
111 Nw. U.L. REV. 891,
93-909 (2017); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy ofPrivacy, 154 U. PA. REV. 477, 54659 (2006).
151 Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions, Ventura v. Kyle, (RHK/SER) 27 (D. Minn.
Apr. 21, 2014) ( No. 12-0472). The proposed instruction is taken verbatim from MINN.
PRAC. SERIES, CIVJIG 72.15 (6th ed. 2014).
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Kyle's proposed jury instruction on appropriation was more detailed:
A defendant is liable for invasion of privacy/appropriation
if he improperly appropriates another person's name for
his or her own use or benefit. The value of a plaintiffs
name is not appropriated by mere mention of it, or by
reference to it in connection with legitimate mention of his
public activities.
A plaintiff does not have the right to object merely
because his name or his appearance is brought before the
public. The publication of biographical data of a wellknown figure does not constitute an invasion of privacy or
a wrongful appropriation of his name.
A plaintiff cannot recover where the plaintiffs name is
used in connection with communications about matters of
legitimate public interest, so long as there is a real
relationship between the plaintiff and the subject matter of
the publication.
The plaintiff has the burden to show that his name has
been appropriated. If he does not meet this burden, you
must find for the defendant. 15 2
The district court gave the following five-sentence instruction on
appropriation:
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura also claims that Chris Kyle
invaded his privacy by appropriating his name. To prevail
on this appropriation claim, Mr. Ventura must have
proved his defamation claim. Mr. Ventura must also prove
by the greater weight of the evidence that Mr. Kyle
appropriated to his own use or benefit the value of Mr.
Ventura's name.
The value of a person's name is not appropriated by mere
mention of it or in connection with publication about
matters of legitimate public interest, so long as there is a
Defendant's Revisions to Selected Proposed Jury Instructions, Defendant's Revised
Final Instruction No. 24--Elements of the Claim of Appropriation, Ventura v. Kyle,
2014 WL 8721598 (footnotes omitted).
152

SPRING 2019)

U. oFDEATT,,ER SPoRTs & EATTERTAiATmEATTL.J

121

real relationship between the plaintiff and the subject
matter of the publication. It is only considered
appropriation when a plaintiffs name is used for the
purpose of appropriating to the defendant's benefit the
commercial or other value associated with the plaintiff's
name. 153
The first sentence introduces the claim. The second sentence states that
Ventura has to prevail on his defamation claim in order to be entitled to
recover for invasion of privacy. The third incorporates Ventura's
proposed instruction, except rather than stating that the appropriation had
to be of the person's name or likeness, it states that Kyle had to have
appropriated the "value" of Ventura's name. The fourth sentence was
taken from the penultimate paragraph of Kyle's proposed appropriation
instruction, which stated that there is no appropriation if a name is merely
mentioned or used in connection with "matters of legitimate public
interest," if "there is a real relationship between" the person and "the
subject matter of the publication." The last sentence of the instruction
was based substantially on the third-to-the-last paragraph of comment d
to section 652C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 154
The only question on appropriation on the special verdict form was, "Did
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura prove his claim of appropriation against Chris
Kyle?"15 5 The jury answered that question in the negative, but because
the elements of the claim were not broken down in the verdict form, there
is no way of knowing why the jury found in Kyle's favor. The jury might
have found that there was no appropriation because Kyle's purpose was
not to appropriate the commercial or other value associated with
Ventura's name, that the publication was about a matter of "legitimate
public interest," that there was only a "mere mention" of Ventura's name
in connection with a publication about a matter of "legitimate public
interest," or that there was no "real relationship" between Ventura and
the subject matter of the publication. Take your pick.
15 3

JUry Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 9, Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-472, 2014 WL
3729686. The instruction uses the term publication. The defamation instruction
focused on the story. The instructions should have been consistent in use of the "story"
as the focus of both claims.
154 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.1977).
155 Special Verdict Form No. 2, Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-0472
(D. Minn. July 29,
2014).
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The last four sentences of the instruction raise several issues. The second
sentence, conditions the right to recover for invasion of privacy on
Ventura's right to recover for defamation. The issue is why. The third
sentence raises an issue as to what constitutes an appropriation for one's
"use or benefit." Commercial use is obvious. Other "benefit" is not. The
fourth raises the issue of how a matter of "legitimate public interest" is
defined, whether it means the same thing as newsworthiness for First
Amendment purposes, why it would be relevant if a jury is first required
to find "actual malice" (a requisite finding if the jury first has to find in
Ventura's favor in order to even consider the appropriation issue), and
why in any event it would be a jury issue rather than a question of law for
the court. The final part of the sentence raises a question as to what a "real
relationship" is between Ventura and the subject matter of the
publication. That sentence also uses the term "publication," which
apparently refers to the book, although Ventura's theory of appropriation
was also based on the subsequent publicity the book received through
Kyle's radio and television appearances to promote the book.
The next sections unpack the instruction and suggest a more simplified
alternative instruction for appropriation cases.
2. Defamation as a Prerequisiteto Appropriation
The first issue is why a finding of defamation should be a prerequisite to
recovery for appropriation. Kyle argued in the first motion for summary
judgment that he was entitled to summary judgment because the First
Amendment protected his statements about Ventura. In a heading entitled
"Invasion of Privacy/Appropriation," the district court noted that
summary judgment was inappropriate because the parties could not agree
whether the statements were true or false. 156 That linked the appropriation
claim to the defamation claim, but without explaining why.

156 Ventura v. Kyle, Civ. No. 12-472, 2012 WL 6634779, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 20,
2012). This is the court's analysis of the issue:
Kyle argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because his statements
about Ventura are protected by the First Amendment. See Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, (1977) (applying First
Amendment analysis to invasion-of-privacy claim); C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg.,
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823-24
(8th Cir.2007) (First Amendment privilege defeated right-of-publicity claim).
But this argument depends entirely on his own version of the facts and
ignores Ventura's. His statements are not protected by the First Amendment
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If the jury did not find for Ventura on the defamation claim, it could have
been for various reasons. The jury might have found that Ventura was
unable to prove that the story was false, or if it was, that Kyle did not
know it was false or that he did not have substantial doubts about its truth.
But even if the defamation claim failed for either or both of those reasons,
the issue is why the appropriation claim would necessarily be barred.
While there is often an element of falsity in appropriation claims,
appropriation of a person's name or likeness for the defendant's benefit,
commercial or otherwise, may be actionable, Ventura might have claimed
that even if the story were true, Kyle used the story (and Ventura's name)
for the primary purpose of gaining a commercial advantage. If so, there
would still be impediments to the claim, however. The story about Kyle's
encounter with Scuff Face would most certainly be newsworthy, and that
story played only a small part in Kyle's overall life story, small enough
to be simply an incidental use in connection with that larger story.
If that is accepted, the issue then is why a finding of defamation, which
necessarily included a finding that the story was defamatory, false and
that Kyle published it with knowledge of the falsity or with substantial
doubts about its truth, would place Ventura in a better position with
respect to the appropriation claim. If the Scruff Face story was false, and
Kyle knew it was false or had substantial doubts about its truth, the
newsworthiness defense would necessarily collapse, opening the door to
an appropriation claim that would likely be precluded if the story were
true. There is no First Amendment interest in protecting a false
appropriation claim when the use of a person's name or likeness is
defamatory, false, and made with actual malice.
The conclusion that follows from the court's ruling is that if the
statements are not protected by the First Amendment because they were
false, and that Kyla knew they were false or had substantial doubts about
their truth, there is no constitutionalbar to the claim for appropriation.
Kyle's publication of a false story with knowledge of the falsity or
if they were knowingly false and defamatory, as Ventura claims. See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 73 (1964). Because the parties do not agree whether Kyle's
statements were true or false, the Court cannot determine whether the First
Amendment protects them.
Id.
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substantial doubts about its truth tips the case to actionable appropriation.
But, whether true or false, Ventura would still have to establish that his
name or likeness was more than just an incidental use of his name or
likeness.
The finding that the actual malice standard was met leads to the next
question of whether that finding should have prevented jury consideration
of whether the publication was about a matter of legitimate public
concern. There is an auxiliary question of whether that issue should have
been for the jury in any event.
3. Legitimate PublicInterest
The instruction states that the value of a person's name is not appropriated
if there is a "mere mention of it in connection about matters of legitimate
public interest." The term "legitimate public interest" is not defined for
the jury, but incorporation of the term in the instruction requires a finding
on that issue in order for the jury to consider the other parts of the
instruction.
There are at least two issues that are involved. One is how the term
"legitimate public interest" should be defined. A second is whether the
issue is one for the jury, or a question of law for the court. A third is
whether consideration of that issue was foreclosed by the jury's finding
in Ventura's favor on the defamation claim.
Defining what is newsworthy, or what is a matter of legitimate concern
to the public is problematic,"' as is the issue of whether newsworthiness
should be a question of fact for the jury or a question of law for the court.
In cases involving the issue of whether a public employee may be
discharged for commentary on a matter of public concern, courts take the
position that the issue is a question of law for the court.` 8 The Supreme
Court considers it to be a question of law in defamation claims involving

15. See Randall P. Bezanson, The DevelopingLaw ofEditorialJudgment, 78 NEB. L.
REV. 754, 778 (1999); Allen Rostron, The MugshotIndustry: Freedom ofSpeech,
Rights of Publicity, and the ControversySparked ByAn Unusual New Type of
Business, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 1321, 1330 (2013).
158 E.g., Callaghanv. City of S. Portland, 76 A.3d 348, 354 (Mass. 2013); Santerv.

Bd. of Educ. of East Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 13 N.E.3d 1028, 1038 (N.Y.
2014); Sprague v. Spokane Valley Fire Dep't, No. 93800-8, 2018 WL 547363, *9
(Wash. Jan. 25, 2018).
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a matter of public concern,15 9 limitations on the claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress,16 0 and cases involving speech by public
employees. 16 1 Leaving the issue to a jury in cases involving appropriation
claims is inconsistent with those decisions.
4. Use or Benefit and Damages
Early wrangling over Ventura's appropriation claim involved the issue of
whether Ventura should be limited to damages for commercial
appropriation. Kyle argued in his motion for summary judgment that
appropriation was limited to commercial appropriation, but the district
court rejected the argument. 16 2 The trial court instructed the jury that
Ventura had to prove that Kyle "appropriated to his own use or benefit
the value of Mr. Ventura's name," and that "[i]t is only considered
appropriation when a plaintiffs name is used for the purpose of
appropriating to the defendant's benefit the commercial or other value
associated with the plaintiffs name."163 According to the instruction,
actionable appropriation is not limited to the appropriation of just the
commercial value of the plaintiffs name, and the benefit may be other
than commercial.
That left the damages instruction.

159 See Milkovichv. Lorain Journal, Inc., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990); Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,778 (1986); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
160 See Snyderv. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 553 (2011).
161 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2014).
162 Ventura, 2012 WL 6634779, at
*3.
163 Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 9, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729686
(first
emphasis the court's; second emphasis added).
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Ventura's proposed instruction on damages was based on section 49 of
the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition1 6 4 :
Damages for invasion of privacy by appropriation are the
greater of either the pecuniary loss to the person whose
likeness is appropriated or the pecuniary gain to the person
who appropriated the other's likeness.
Kyle proposed the following instruction on damages for appropriation
(and unjust enrichment):
Jesse Ventura has also claimed damages for invasion of
privacy/appropriation and unjust enrichment. No fixed
standard exists for deciding the amount of damages for
using a plaintiffs name or likeness for the benefit of a
defendant. You must use your judgment to decide a
reasonable amount based on the evidence and your
common sense. If you do not find by a preponderance of
the evidence that Ventura has proved the elements of
appropriation or unjust enrichment, then he cannot prevail

164

Section 49 in its entirety reads as follows:
(1) One who is liable for an appropriation of the commercial value of
another's identity under the rule stated in § 46 is liable for the pecuniary loss
to the other caused by the appropriation or for the actor's own pecuniary gain
resulting from the appropriation, whichever is greater, unless such relief is
precluded by an applicable statute or is otherwise inappropriate under the rule
stated in Subsection (2).

(2) Whether an award of monetary relief is appropriate and the appropriate
method of measuring such relief depend upon a comparative appraisal of all
the factors of the case, including the following primary factors:
(a) the degree of certainty with which the plaintiff has established
the fact and extent of the pecuniary loss or the actor's pecuniary gain
resulting from the appropriation;
(b) the nature and extent of the appropriation;
(c) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of other remedies;
(d) the intent of the actor and whether the actor knew or should have
known that the conduct was unlawful;
(e) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit or
otherwise asserting his or her rights; and
(f) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 (Am. Law. Inst.1995).
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on that claim and you must find in favor of the Kyle Estate
as to this element of damages. 1 6 5
Ventura's proposed instruction was narrowed to pecuniary loss,
notwithstanding his earlier arguments that damages should not be so
limited in appropriation cases; the defendant's proposed instruction was
not so limited, although it was vague in terms of the exact kinds of
damages that the jury could award.
The trial court accepted Ventura's proposed jury instruction, with
modifications:
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of
appropriation, you must award him the greater of either
the amount the Defendant Estate has gained as a direct
result of the appropriation or the amount Mr. Ventura has
lost as a direct result of the appropriation. 16 6
The damages instruction effectively compresses the broader theory of
appropriation into the narrower theory of publicity.
The value of Ventura's name would have to be the commercial value.
The benefit could be other than commercial benefit, although what that
benefit might be is not defined in the instruction; but the damages
instruction necessarily limits that gain to commercial gain and the loss to
Ventura commercial loss. That gain and loss was the focus of the proof
in the case. 167 Ventura's argued that damages should not be limited to
commercial loss, 168 but his proposed jury instructions for appropriation
damages compressed the issue into one of commercial loSS. 1 69

Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 25 (Custom Instruction 2)
Ventura v. Kyle, No. 12-0472 27.
166 Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 13, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL
3729686 (D.
Minn. July 22, 2014) (12-cv-0472) (emphasis the court's).
167 Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for
Judgment as a Matter of Law or a New Trial, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 5018930 part
D, (detailing evidence of gain and loss on the unjust enrichment issue).
168 Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Reply to Defendant's Trial Brief, Part D. 1, Ventura
v.
Kyle, 2014 WL 3729676 (No. 12-0472), (D. Minn. May 5, 2014).
169 The Restatement is clear that section 49 "states the rules governing the recovery
of
monetary relief in actions for infringement of the right of publicity." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 cmt. a (Am. Law. Inst. 1995).
165
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The potential damages for appropriation, other than commercial loss,
could include damages for emotional harm associated with the
appropriation. The damages instruction effectively seems to foreclose
those damages.
5. Real Relationship
The instruction states that there is no appropriation of a person's name by
"mere mention of it or in connection with publication about matters of
legitimate public interest, so long as there is a realrelationshipbetween
the plaintiff and the subject matter of the publication." The terms "mere
mention" and "real relationship" are not defined in the instruction.
Comment d of the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains the issue:
The value of the plaintiffs name is not appropriated by
mere mention of it, or by reference to it in connection with
legitimate mention of his public activities; nor is the value
of his likeness appropriated when it is published for
purposes other than taking advantage of his reputation,
prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes
of publicity. No one has the right to object merely because
his name or his appearance is brought before the public,
since neither is in any way a private matter and both are
open to public observation. It is only when the publicity is
given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's
benefit the commercial or other values associated with the
name or the likeness that the right of privacy is invaded. 7 0
The dividing line is important, because in cases where a book is
published, and it discusses a public figure, there is always the possibility
that there was at least some motivation to use that name to enhance the
story and the salability of the book. Not all uses are actionable, however.
The "real relationship" standard is a means of separating actionable from
nonactionable uses, but when it is used as a standard for a jury to apply
without further definition, it does not provide much assistance. The focus,
as noted in comment d, is on the purpose of the use of the name or
likeness. That was the key factor in Ventura's case: was Kyle's purpose
170 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)
(emphasis added). An incidental use of the plaintiff's name or likeness is insufficient
to trigger liability for appropriation. The reason is that the incident
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to gain an advantage by his portrayal of Ventura in the Scuff Face
subchapter and in the talk shows following.
6. An Alternative?
Embodying the key concepts in appropriation cases in a way that juries
can understand is difficult. We may have a pretty good idea of the
paradigms that spawn appropriation claims, but the general way in which
the law is formulated, including in the Restatements, is not particularly
helpful in drafting coherent jury instructions on appropriation. In effect,
the issue is effectively punted in pattern jury instructions, which leaves
juries without sufficient guidance in deciding the cases. An additional
complicating factor is the lack of clarity concerning the role ofjudges and
juries in appropriation cases. That may lead to over-instructing a jury in
appropriation cases. That seemed to be what happened in Ventura's case.
What follows is a suggested instruction that avoids some of the common
problems with jury instructions in appropriation cases:
(Defendant) appropriates the value of another person's name or
likeness when (he) (she)
(1)

takes advantage of the reputation, prestige, or other value
that is associated with the other person's name or likeness,
and

(2)

a primary purpose of (defendant) is to use that reputation,
prestige, or other value associated with the other person's
name or likeness for (his) (her) own benefit.

The use may be for commercial benefit, although it does not have
to be.
The proposed instruction is perhaps conspicuous because of what it does
not include. The instruction is based on the assumption that the issue of
whether the public concerned a matter of legitimate public interest is a
question of law for the court to decide. It omits the "mere mention" and
"real relationship" language that was used in the district court's
instruction. Those concepts are difficult for ajury to understand and apply
and may be more suitable for a court considering a summary judgment
motion in an appropriation case. The key element is whether the
defendant's primary purpose was to use the plaintiff's name or likeness
for his own advantage.
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The damages issue also has to be sorted. The pecuniary loss to the
plaintiff/pecuniary gain jury instructions in the case ran damages through
what was effectively a "publicity" pinch point. Damages may be broader
and jury instructions on the damages issue should provide for the broader
elements of damages, if the controlling law allows.
C. Unjust Enrichment
Ventura's third theory of recovery was unjust enrichment. The complaint
alleged that "[a]s a direct result of his tortious, inequitable and unlawful
conduct, Kyle has been unjustly enriched at Governor Ventura's
expense," 17 and that "[e]quity requires that Kyle make restitution to
Governor Ventura for all property and benefits unjustly received,
including but not limited to income from the sale of American Sniper
books and/or any subsidiary or ancillary rights sales." 172
Kyle argued from the outset that Ventura was not entitled to recover for
unjust enrichment, in part because Ventura had an adequate remedy at
law and in part because an unjust enrichment theory basing damages on
the benefit to the defendant would be inconsistent with the First
Amendment. 173
1. Jury Instructions
Ventura proposed the following instruction on unjust enrichment:
Definition of unjust enrichment
A defendant has been unjustly enriched where:
1. Defendant knowingly received something valuable
from the plaintiff;
2. Defendant is not entitled to the benefit received; and
3. Circumstances exist that would make it unjust for the
defendant to retain the benefit received without
compensation to the plaintiff.

171 Complaint, ¶ 50.
172
Id. ¶51.
173 Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment,
Part III, Venturav. Kyle, 2012 WL 11622854 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2012) (No. 12-472).
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An action for unjust enrichment must be based on
situations where it would be morally wrong for one party
to enrich himself at the expense of another.
Damages that can be recovered for an unjust enrichment
claim are based on what the person enriched has
inappropriately received, rather than on what the opposing
party has lost."'
Kyle's proposed instruction on unjust enrichment reads as follows:
A defendant has been unjustly enriched if he "has
knowingly received or obtained something of value for
which [he] in equity and good conscience should pay."
"Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one
party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but
instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched
in the sense that the term 'unjustly' could mean illegally
or unlawfully." An author or publisher is not held to have
received a benefit merely because the publication that
referred to plaintiff was published for profit. In such cases,
unjust enrichment requires Plaintiff to prove a deliberate
association with the defendant's products in an advertising
or promotional scheme unrelated to the book, broadcast,
or other mass communication.
The Plaintiff has the burden to prove that the defendant
was enriched and the amount by which the defendant was
enriched. If Jesse Ventura fails to do so, you must find for
Taya Kyle.1 75

The district court gave the following instruction on unjust enrichment:
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura also claims that Chris Kyle and the
Defendant Estate were unjustly enriched by the story
about Mr. Ventura. To prevail on this unjust-enrichment
171 Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions, Custom Instruction 3, Ventura
v. Kyle (D.
Minn. Apr. 21, 2014) (No. 12-0472).
175 Defendant's Revisions to Selected Proposed Jury Instructions, Defendant's
Revised Final Instruction No. 25--Elements of the Claim of Unjust Enrichment,
Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 8721598 (D. Minn. June 18, 2014) (No. 12-cv-0472)
(footnotes omitted).
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claim, Mr. Ventura must have proved his defamation
claim. He must also prove by the greater weight of the
evidence:
One, the Defendant Estate knowingly received a benefit
from the story; and
Two, the Defendant Estate is not entitled to the benefit
received because circumstances exist that would make it
unjust for the Defendant Estate to retain that benefit
without compensating Mr. Ventura. 176

The instruction closely followed Ventura's proposed instruction. The two
elements required a showing of benefit to Kyle's estate, but without
defining that benefit, and second, that the estate was not entitled to the
benefit it received because it would be unjust for the estate to retain the
benefits without compensating Ventura. Because unjust enrichment is an
equitable claim, the jury was acting in an advisory capacity in
determining whether Ventura established the claim.17 7
The district court's instruction on damages for unjust enrichment gave
the jury substantial latitude in awarding damages:
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of unjust
enrichment, you must award him the amount of money by
which you find the Defendant Estate has been unjustly
enriched. However, if you find that Mr. Ventura's
176

Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 10, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686 (No. 12-

0472). The instruction's generality is a function of the general nature of the unjust
enrichment theory. See DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES §
4.1(2) (3d ed. 2018). Other pattern instructions are similar to Minnesota's. For
example, Maryland's pattern instruction states that:
A plaintiff may recover from a defendant on a claim for unjust enrichment
upon proving the following three elements:
(1) A benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff;
(2) An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and
(3) The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under
circumstances that would make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without the payment of its value.
MARYLAND CIV. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MPJI-Cv 9:32 (5th ed. 2018). The
damages instruction states simply that "[t]he measure of damages for unjust
enrichment is the value of the benefit conferred upon the defendant." Id.
177 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.
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damages award for defamation and/or appropriation
provide him with an adequate remedy, you may not award
him any further damages for unjust enrichment.17 1
Question five on the special verdict form asked only:
Did Plaintiff Jesse Ventura prove his claim of unjust
enrichment against Chris Kyle and the Defendant Estate?
(See Jury Instruction No. 10.)179

The jury answered "yes" to that question.
The damages question asked:
By what amount of money, if any, has the Defendant
Estate been unjustly enriched? (See Jury Instruction No.
13 for the means of determining damages.)so
The jury set the damages at $1,345,477.25.
Kyle argued in his motion for JMOL that the damages award for unjust
enrichment could not be sustained because Ventura had an adequate
remedy at law. The district court initially rejected the argument because
it was not raised in a timely manner, but held that even if it had, the
damages award for defamation was not adequate."'
The Eighth Circuit, reversed, holding that Ventura was not unjustly
enriched as a matter of Minnesota law and that it was therefore
unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim or the issue of whether
the district court's factual findings supported the damages claim.18 2
178

Jury Instructions, Jury Instruction No. 13, Ventura, 2014 WL 3729686 (No. 12-

0472).
179 Verdict Form,

Question 5, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729681 (D. Minn. July 29,

2014) (No. 12-CV 12-472).
180 Special Verdict Form, at 2, Venturav. Kyle, No. 12-0472 (D. Minn. July 29, 2014).
181 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. at 1009-1011.
182

825 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2016)The evidentiary support for the jury's award of

substantial damages for unjust enrichment was questionable. The district court
defended its decision to accept the jury's award of $1,345,477 in damages for unjust
enrichment, holding that the evidence supported the court's conclusion that Kyle
"unfairly profited from the story regarding" Ventura, and "that the jury's calculation of
damages fell within a reasonable range (approximately 25% of American Sniper 's

134

U. OFDEATvERSpoRTs&EATTERTAiATmEATTL.J

(VOL. 22

2. The Common Law
The Minnesota Supreme Court has characterized unjust enrichment as
"an equitable doctrine that allows a plaintiff to recover a benefit conferred
upon a defendant when retention of the benefit is not legally
justifiable."18 3 The theory requires the claimant to "establish an impliedin-law or quasi-contract in which the defendant received a benefit of
value that unjustly enriched the defendant in a manner that is illegal or
unlawful." 18 4 Equitable relief is not permitted where the party has an
adequate remedy at law."s'
The Eighth Circuit rejected the unjust enrichment claim for two reasons.
First, while noting that Ventura was correct in noting that a quasi-contract
will be imposed if the plaintiff "unknowingly or unwillingly" imposes a
profits)." Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1009 n.3. Kyle's brief attacked the award based
on the lack of evidentiary support for the award. Brief of Appellant at 65-68, Ventura,
825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3876). The brief argued, among other things,
that "Ventura relied solely on speculation that the mention of his name on a radio and
a television interview must have increased profits simply because sales of the book
continued to rise following those appearances," Id. at 65, and "[t]he district court
asserted that its award constituted "approximately 25%" of the $6 million in royalties
Ventura claimed the book had generated," but with "no basis for its assertion that
'approximately 25%' of the book's sales were driven by use of Ventura's name; it
plucked the number from thin air." Id. at 67.
In Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995), in contrast, the
damages for Ventura's quantum meruit claim arising out of the use of his likeness on
wrestling videotapes produced by Titan Sports, Ventura established damages with
specificity. The evidence was much more specific on the value of the use of his
likeness and on the royalty rates applicable to the use of his likeness.
183 Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 838 (Minn. 2012).
There are numerous Minnesota cases stating that unjust enrichment is applicable in
cases in which it would be morally wrong for a party to enrich himself at the expense
of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Klass v. Twin City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 190 N.W.2d 493,
495 (Minn. 1971) (suit by lessee to recover part of a condemnation award that was
intended to reimburse the lessor for real taxes that had been paid by the lessee under
the provisions of a lease agreement); Cady v. Bush, 166 N.W.2d 358, 362-63 (Minn.
1969) (suit by motel purchases against vendors for the return of properties that were
exchanged and cash payments that were made pursuant to a contract); Holman v. CPT
Corp., 457 N.W.2d 740, 745 (Minn. Ct. App.1990) (unjust enrichment claim based on
failure
to pay sales commissions).
18
4

d.

Ventura, 825 F.3d at 887, quoting ServiceMaster of St. Cloud v. GAB Bus. Serv.,
Inc., 544 N.W.2d 302, 305 (Minn. 1996) ("A party may not have equitable relief where
there is an adequate remedy at law available.").
185
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"benefit" on the defendant, the court rejected Ventura's argument "that
Ventura conferred a 'benefit' on Kyle by Ventura's mere existence as a
colorful figure who might inspire people to make up stories about
him." 186
Second, the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment would be unavailable
because Ventura, a public figure, had an adequate remedy at law in his
defamation claim against Kyle for money damages. The district court
held that Ventura's claim for defamation claim was inadequate:
.

The jury was expressly advised-at Defendant's behest

. . that it could not award additional damages for unjust

enrichment if it found that Plaintiff s "damages award for
defamation ... provide[d] him with an adequate remedy."
. . . This scuttles Defendant's argument. Plaintiffs

defamation claim provided him with no means to obtain
the disgorgement of Defendant's ill-gotten gains-money
the jury found, and the Court agreed, that Defendant made
by defaming Plaintiff in American Sniper. Only through
unjust enrichment could Plaintiff attempt to force
Defendant to yield those improper profits. Under these
circumstances, Plaintiff's legal remedy was inadequate to
fully ameliorate Defendant's wrongful conduct, and the
defamation claim did not preclude the unjust-enrichment
claim as a matter of law.187

The Eighth Circuit rejected that argument for two reasons. The first is
that the issue of whether there is an adequate remedy at law is a question
of law for the court, rather than a question of fact for the jury."ss The
second reason is that Ventura was adequately compensated for injury to
his reputation by the jury's award of $500,000 on his defamation claim.
The court found no contrary authority that would support the award of
damages for unjust enrichment in these circumstances.189
186

Id. (citing Galante v. Oz, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).

This evokes the incidental use issue in appropriation cases.
17

Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1011 (emphasis is the court's).

1I

Ventura v. Kyle, 825 F.3d at 887.

189

Ventura, 825 F.3d at 887. The court cited "one of the few cases addressing the

issue," Hart v. E.P. Dutton & Co., 93 N.Y.S.2d 871, 879 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949), which

noted the novelty of such a claim and the absence of support for such a claim. 825
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3. The FirstAmendment
The district court rejected Kyle's argument that that the damages award
for unjust enrichment violated the First Amendment. While recognizing
that the Supreme Court has taken the position that some knowingly false
speech is protected by the First Amendment, the court concluded that
defendants have "no carte blanche immunity to lie with impunity," and
that Kyle was simply wrong in his claim that the First Amendment
necessitates limiting damages for actionable false speech.190 The court
relied in part on the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Alvarez,1 9 1 for the proposition that government restrictions on speech are
permissible in cases "[w]here false claims are made to effect a fraud or
secure moneys or other value considerations,"192and in part on Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,193 for the proposition that because punitive damages
are available in a defamation action where there is knowledge of the
falsity or reckless disregard of the truth, by analogy damages for
disgorgement should be allowed for unjust enrichment because both
damages claims transcend compensatory damages. 1 94
The district court's ruling on the First Amendment issue drew fire in
Kyle's appellate brief1 9 5 and in two amicus briefs in the case. 1 9 6 One
amicus brief attacked the district court's holding based primarily on the
lack of support in Minnesota law for an unjust enrichment claim. 1 9 7 The
other opened its argument by stating that "[t]he notion that a court may
award profits as damages for allegedly defamatory conduct is all but

F.3d at 888. The Eighth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court's opinion in
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23, noting that the claim for damages, even if an imperfect
remedy, is the only means of vindicating a claim for injury to reputation.
190 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1011.
191 United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
192 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1011, (citing Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (emphasis
the
district court's)).
193 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 349
(1974).
194 Ventura, 63 F. Supp. 3d at 1011, (citing, 418 U.S. at 349 (1974)).
195 Brief of Appellant at 59-65, Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No.
14-3876).
196 Brief of Amici Curiae 33 Media Companies and
Organizations at 16-24, Ventura,
825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3876); Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas More
Law Center at 2, Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3876).
197 Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas More Law Center, Ventura, 825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir.
2016) (No. 14-3876).
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unknown in Americanjurisprudence." 1 9 8 The brief focused on the reasons
for the lack of authority for the award of those damages as a first point.
As a second, the brief attacked the district court's analogy of
disgorgement damages to the award of punitive damages in defamation
cases, based in part on the criticism of permitting punitive damages in
public figure defamation cases, the lack of any Supreme Court decision
expressly permitting public figures to recover for those damages, and the
more stringent standards states, including Minnesota, have adopted in
punitive damages cases.199
The Eighth Circuit avoided the necessity of deciding the First
Amendment issue because of its conclusion that Minnesota law did not
support the unjust enrichment theory.20 0 If followed, the court's position
that compensatory damages in unjust enrichment cases will not be
allowed where the plaintiff has an adequate remedy in law via a
defamation action would foreclose any necessity of the consideration of
the issue from a First Amendment standpoint in any future cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Jesse Ventura's lawsuit against Chris Kyle's estate brought into sharp
focus important issues relating to defamation, appropriation, and unjust
enrichment. Many of the legal issues concerning the standards that
governed the theories of recovery were heavily briefed and thoughtfully
considered by the district court, which had difficult decisions to make in
determining how to instruct the jury. The key defamation issues that are
the subject of this article were not considered by the Eighth Circuit when
it reversed based on the improper mention of insurance in the case. It did
not reach the appropriation issues because the jury found in Kyle's favor
on that claim. The judgment on the unjust enrichment claim was reversed
because Minnesota law did not support it.

Brief of Amici Curiae 33 Media Companies and Organizations at 16, Ventura, 825
F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3876).
199 Brief of Amici Curiae 33 Media Companies and Organizations at 22-24, Ventura,
825 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-3876). Minnesota's punitive damages statute,
Minn. Stat. § 549.20 (2016), requires proof of deliberate indifference to the rights of
the plaintiff and applies a clear and convincing evidence standard to that
determination.
200 Ventura, 825 F.3d at 886.
198
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While key issues swirling around Ventura's defamation and
appropriation claims were irrelevant in the Eighth Circuit's decision,
those issues will be recurrent in many cases. The goal of this article in
working through those issues is to suggest a way of avoiding some of the
sticking points, resolving them early, and generating jury instructions that
can simplify the issues for juries asked to decide these sorts of cases.
In defamation cases, there should be early clarification of the standard for
determining actual malice and the burden of proof on the falsity issue.
Pattern instructions generally provide working definitions of "actual
malice" that need not be amplified.
A public figure who establishes actual malice is entitled to presumed
damages, but it is important to understand that there are boundaries that
can be imposed on those damages through appropriate jury instructions.
The issue concerning the limitation on damages for mental distress will
not be replicated in other cases, leaving plaintiffs who establish New York
Times actual malice open to recovery for emotional harm as an element
of presumed damages. It is also important to understand that even though
damages are presumed, the plaintiff may attempt to prove actual
damages. Defendants may also attempt to prove diminished reputation
with appropriate evidence.
The appropriation claim in a public figure context seems complex. There
were several issues in the case that had to be resolved in determining how
the case would be submitted to the jury. Had the Scruff Face story been
true, it would not have been actionable, which is why the district court
instructed the jury that it had to first find that Ventura was entitled to
recover for defamation before it could consider the appropriation claim.
When Ventura necessarily established New York Times actual malice in
order for the jury to get to the appropriation claim, it should have
precluded jury consideration of the issue of whether the publication was
a matter of legitimate pubic concern.
That still would have left issues concerning Kyle's purpose in using the
Scruff Face story. Looking at the district court's instructions in the case,
questions remained concerning whether there was simply a "mere
mention" of Ventura's name, or a "real relationship between the plaintiff
and the subject matter of the publication," according to the district court's
jury instruction on appropriation. The language is loose, not only in the
jury instruction, but in the cases. Providing a jury with a tighter standard
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for resolving those key issues, and eliminating the issues the jury need
not decide, will facilitate the jury's decision-making in these cases.
While damages in appropriation cases may include damages for mental
distress, Ventura abandoned his claim for emotional harm based on the
appropriation. The damages issue in Ventura's case narrowed to a
consideration of the amount of loss to Ventura or the amount gained by
the estate; the district court's instruction excluded damages for emotional
harm. Those damages would be permissible in an appropriate case,
assuming a proper foundation, and assuming that the relevant jurisdiction
does not limit damages for the tort of appropriation solely to commercial
loss to the plaintiff or gain to the defendant. Any time there is an
appropriation claim, questions may arise concerning the appropriate
measure of damages. Ventura's circumstances seemed to be unique,
given the stipulation concerning recovery of damages for mental distress,
but in other cases those damages may be awarded, given appropriation
proof Plaintiffs in cases involving damages for emotional harm will not
have to prove the value of their name or likeness in order to justify
recovery. In cases involving commercial appropriation there will have to
be proof of the benefit to the defendant or the loss to the plaintiff.201
The unjust enrichment issue was Minnesota-specific in the case, but the
specter of using that theory as a means of enhancing damages in a
defamation case is questionable. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in the case,
if followed, puts the issue to rest.
Many appropriation cases will involve the issue of whether there are First
Amendment limitations on the right to recover. The starting point forjury
instructions will be pattern instructions, but many of the pattern
instructions are very brief, primarily because of the lack of authority that
would justify more expansive instructions on the privacy issues. The First
Amendment issue should be a question of law for the court, and, in the
suggested alternative instruction, issues concerning "mere mention" and
"real relationship" should be collapsed into the more simplified issue of
the defendant's purpose in using the plaintiff's name or likeness.
As a final point, there is significant benefit in working through a complex
lawsuit like this. The excellent work of the lawyers exhibited in the
201

Plaintiff Jesse Ventura's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for

Judgment as a Matter of Law or a New Trial, Part II, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL
3729679 (D. Minn. July 18, 2014).
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numerous skirmishes over jury instructions in the case has hopefully
resulted in a clearer understanding of the law that applies in public figure
cases involving defamation and appropriation claims, and in the jury
instructions that emerge from that law.
APPENDIX

Jury Instructions, Ventura v. Kyle, 2014 WL 3729686 (D. Minn. July 22,
2014)(12-cv-0472)
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 6
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura asserts three claims against Chris Kyle and the
Defendant Estate: (1) defamation; (2) invasion of privacy by
appropriation; and (3) unjust enrichment. The following instructions will
explain each of these claims in more detail, as well as Mr. Ventura's
burden of proof.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7
There are two standards of proof that you will apply to the evidence in
this case, depending on the issue you are considering.
For the most part, you must decide whether certain facts have been
proved by "the greater weight of the evidence." A fact has been proved
by the greater weight of the evidence if you find that it is more likely true
than not true. You decide that by considering all of the evidence and
deciding which evidence is more believable.
But on one issue (discussed in Instruction
whether a certain fact has been proved
evidence." A fact has been proved by clear
you find it is highly probable that it is true or,
believe it is true.

No. 8C), you must decide
by "clear and convincing
and convincing evidence if
put another way, you firmly

You may have heard the term "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." That is
a stricter standard that applies in criminal cases. It does not apply in civil
cases such as this one.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8
In this case, Plaintiff Jesse Ventura claims that Chris Kyle defamed him
by asserting in American Sniper, as well as on television and radio, that
Mr. Ventura said "he hates America," the SEALs "were killing men and
women and children and murdering," and the SEALs "deserve to lose a
few." To prevail on this defamation claim, Mr. Ventura must prove:
One, Mr. Kyle's story about Mr. Ventura was defamatory;
Two, the story was materially false; and
Three, Chris Kyle published the story knowing it was false, believing it
was false, or having serious doubts about its truth.
If any of these three elements has not been proved, then you must answer
"No" to Question No. 1 on the Verdict Form.
The following instructions explain each of these elements in more detail.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8A
The first element is that Mr. Kyle's story about Mr. Ventura was
defamatory. The story was defamatory if it tends to:
1. So harm the reputation of Mr. Ventura that it lowers his esteem in the
community; or
2. Deter persons from associating or dealing with him; or
3. Injure his character; or
4. Subject him to ridicule, contempt, or distrust; or
5. Degrade or disgrace him in the eyes of others.
Mr. Ventura must prove this element by the greater weight of the
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evidence (see Instruction No. 7).
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8B
The second element is that Mr. Kyle's story about Mr. Ventura was
materiallyfalse or, put another way, was not substantially accurate. The
story may be substantially accurate even if it contains minor inaccuracies,
as long as the substance or gist of it is accurate.
Mr. Ventura must prove this element by the greater weight of the
evidence (see Instruction No. 7).
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8C
The third element is that Mr. Kyle published the story about Mr. Ventura
despite:
1. Knowing the story was false; or
2. Believing the story was false; or
3. Having serious doubts about the story's truth.
Mr. Ventura must prove this element by clear and convincing evidence
(see Instruction No. 7).
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura also claims that Chris Kyle invaded his privacy by
appropriating his name. To prevail on this appropriation claim, Mr.
Ventura must have proved his defamation claim. Mr. Ventura must also
prove by the greater weight of the evidence that Mr. Kyle appropriated to
his own use or benefit the value of Mr. Ventura's name.
The value of a person's name is not appropriated by mere mention of it
or in connection with publication about matters of legitimate public
interest, so long as there is a real relationship between the plaintiff and
the subject matter of the publication. It is only considered appropriation
when a plaintiff s name is used for the purpose of appropriating to the
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defendant's benefit the commercial or other value associated with the
plaintiff s name.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10
Plaintiff Jesse Ventura also claims that Chris Kyle and the Defendant
Estate were unjustly enriched by the story about Mr. Ventura. To prevail
on this unjust-enrichment claim, Mr. Ventura must have proved his
defamation claim. He must also prove by the greater weight of the
evidence:
One, the Defendant Estate knowingly received a benefit from the story;
and
Two, the Defendant Estate is not entitled to the benefit received because
circumstances exist that would make it unjust for the Defendant Estate to
retain that benefit without compensating Mr. Ventura.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 11
I am about to instruct you as to damages, and you should understand that
this should not be considered as suggesting any view of mine as to
whether Mr. Ventura has proved any of his claims or is entitled to
damages.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 12
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of defamation, you may
presume he has suffered damages and award him the amount of money
you determine he is entitled to receive for harm to his reputation and
standing in the community, humiliation, and embarrassment. No
evidence of actual harm is required for you to award him these damages.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13
Before you award any of the following damages that I am about to
describe, you must first determine that Mr. Ventura has proved them by
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the greater weight of the evidence. He has the burden of proving the
nature, extent, duration, and consequences of these damages (if any) and
your award may not be based on speculation or guess.
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of defamation, you must
also consider whether he has suffered economic loss as a direct result of
the defamation in determining his damages. Economic loss includes the
loss of employment, as well as the denial of employment which he would
have secured but for the defamation.
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of appropriation, you
must award him the greater of either the amount the Defendant Estate has
gained as a direct result of the appropriation or the amount Mr. Ventura
has lost as a direct result of the appropriation.
If you find that Mr. Ventura has proved his claim of unjust enrichment,
you must award him the amount of money by which you find the
Defendant Estate has been unjustly enriched. However, if you find that
Mr. Ventura's damages award for defamation and/or appropriation
provide him with an adequate remedy, you may not award him any
further damages for unjust enrichment.
If you find that damages you would award Mr. Ventura for one claim are
duplicative of the damages you would award him for another claim, you
may not award him those damages under both claims because the law
does not allow double recovery.
Finally, you must not award any damages as a form of punishment or
deterrent.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 14
In conducting your deliberations and returning your verdict, there are
certain rules you must follow. I shall list those rules for you now.
First, when you go to the jury room, you must select one of your members
as your foreperson. That person will preside over your discussions and
speak for you here in court.
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Second, it is your duty, as jurors, to discuss this case with one another in
the jury room. You should try to reach agreement if you can do so without
violence to individual judgment, because your verdict must be
unanimous.
Each of you must make your own conscientious decision, but only after
you have considered all the evidence, discussed it fully with your fellow
jurors, and listened to the views of your fellow jurors.
Do not be afraid to change your opinions if the discussion persuades you
that you should. But do not come to a decision simply because other
jurors think it is right, or simply to reach a verdict.
Third, if you need to communicate with me during your deliberations,
you may send a note to me through the court security officer, signed by
one or more jurors. I will respond as soon as possible either in writing or
orally in open court. Remember that you should not tell anyone -including me -- how your votes stand numerically.
Fourth, your verdict must be based solely on the evidence presented to
you and on the legal principles which I have given to you in my
instructions. Nothing I have said or done is intended to suggest what your
verdict should be -- that is entirely for you to decide.
Finally, the verdict form is simply the written notice of the decision that
you reach in this case. You will take this form to the jury room. The form
has specific questions for you to answer. The form reads: (read form).
Consider the questions in order and follow the directions on the verdict
form. The answer to each question must be the unanimous answer of the
jury. Your foreperson will write the unanimous answer in the space
provided opposite each question. As you will note from the wording of
the questions, some questions should be answered only if certain answers
are given to prior questions.
When each of you has agreed on the verdicts and your foreperson has
entered those verdicts on the form, the foreperson should sign and date
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the form and advise the court security officer that you have reached a
verdict. However, you should not tell anyone what your verdict is, nor
should you give the verdict form to the court security officer.
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